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This thesis examines the process by which General Motors’ Cadillac brand of 
automobiles came to dominate the U.S. luxury car market between 1927 and 1960.  In 
1927, Cadillac was only one among a crowded field of U.S. and European 
automobiles priced above $3000, the threshold of the luxury car market at the time.  
Through a skillful process of marketing, the corporate strength of General Motors, 
and the mistakes and ill-fortune of its competitors; Cadillac came to hold at least 50% 
of the U.S. luxury car market throughout the 1950s, and in some years accounted for 
nearly 70% of that market.  It also briefly examines the reasons for Cadillac’s decline 
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What is Luxury? 
 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary gives the term luxury two modern definitions 
– “a condition of abundance or great ease and comfort” or “ something adding to 
pleasure or comfort but not absolutely necessary.”1 
Certainly, this is accurate but insufficient, for the concept of luxury is relativ , 
dynamic, and highly subjective.   
Basically, the purveyor any luxury good – certainly those marketing luxury 
cars – is selling an illusion.  In the case of an automobile, this illusion has several 
components; including cost, quality, space, speed, convenience, exclusivity, and the 
desire to attain the respect of others. 
Successfully marketing one’s product as a luxury product, and the ability to 
charge the premium price that such products will bear is difficult, especially when 
that product is mass produced.  It is the central thesis of this paper that Cadillac rose 
to a position of dominance in among luxury cars between 1927 and 1960 because of a 
combination of three factors.  First, its advertising successfully and consistently 
presented it as a luxury product that was, nonetheless, available to the newly affluent.  
Second, Cadillac’s styling and engineering were slightly (but only slightly) advanced 
when compared to other automobiles then available.  Third, the structure of General 
Motors was such that it could provide a stream of newly affluent customers who 
already had a history of satisfaction with other General Motors products.   
                                                




The early auto industry was known for a very high rate of attrition.  From the 
earliest days of the industry up to 1961, about 2,750 brands of automobiles had been 
built and sold in the United States.  By 1920 that number had been whittled down to 
61 brands which were competing for a part of a market of approximately two milli n 
units, of which just under half (941,042 units2) were Ford Model Ts.  By 1961, one 
year after the close of this paper, there were nineteen brands being produced by fiv  
U.S. manufacturers (General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, American Motors, and 
Studebaker).3   As of this writing, only three of the traditional U.S. manufacturers 
remain, and their future is questionable. 
To have survived in so caustic an environment for a century is a considerable 
achievement.  To have done so in the smallest segment of that market, luxury cars, is 
remarkable.  To have dominated that segment as completely as Cadillac did in 1960 is 
little short of miraculous. 
The nature of that “miracle” is the essence of this paper.  It was achieved 
through a unique combination of corporate strength and marketing skill.  Here, the 
term “marketing” will be used in a very broad sense to include the processes of 
advertising, pricing, and design of the product.  Between 1927 and 1960 Cadillac 
came to excel in all of these processes.  After a discussion of the U.S. luxury car 
market in the years 1925-1927, this paper will go on to discuss each of the three 
processes in detail. 
                                                
2 http://www.mtfca.com/encyclo/fdprod.htm 
3 Robert J. Holloway, “Which Automobiles will be Here Tomorrow?”, The 




By necessity, the coverage of these aspects is uneven.  In certain aspects of 
this research, I have had a level of information that historians covering other 
industries can only envy.  This is due primarily to two factors.  The first is the 
presence of a motoring press designed to carry information to engineers, dealers, 
mechanics, and owners that sprang up from the very inception of the industry.  The 
second is the work of enthusiasts that started collecting and preserving the products 
themselves, as well as almost every conceivable object connected to those products.  
Therefore, virtually every aspect of the physical objects, the cars themselves, is 
readily available to the historian. 
Unfortunately, it is often difficult to discern the decisions behind the design of 
those products and their marketing.  This is uniquely acute for the historian of 
General Motors.  Sometimes, it seems that G.M. would prefer that its own past be 
forgotten.  The corporation was founded by a plunger and then run by financiers, 
engineers, and accountants – all of them with their eyes firmly fixed upon the futur, 
either in the long or the short term.  The past was seemingly seen as either irrelevant 
or, less often, something to be used as a marketing tool.  On those relatively rare 
occasions that “the General” spoke of its past (for example, the production of its 50 
millionth vehicle in 1954 or its fiftieth anniversary in 1958) it was always in the sense 
of, borrowing from Shakespeare, that “The past is prologue”; the engineering and 
manufacturing triumphs of the past having been used as sales tools to build interest i  
the current product. 
The historical record is agonizingly short on records of information about the 




source is Alfred P. Sloan’s autobiography, My Years with General Motors, co-written 
with John McDonald4.   Even this source, however, has a shroud around it.  
McDonald’s posthumously published A Ghost’s Memoir details the extent to which 
G.M. was willing to go to prevent its long-time chairman from publishing his story.5  
The short version of the story is that General Motors’ management feared that inquiry 
into the inner workings of the corporation would result in its being broken up by the 
federal courts.  As the Supreme Court decision that forced DuPont to divest itself of 
its considerable holdings in General Motors proved, their fears were not entirely 
unfounded.6  For years afterward, there were whisperings that General Motors itself 
would be broken up because its own market dominance constituted a combination in 
restraint of trade.7  Given this attitude, it is hardly surprising that the records and 
reports that helped to establish that dominance have either not been preserved or, at 
least, have not been made accessible to historians.  At the General Motors Heritage 
Center, I was shown a 1962 report prepared for Cadillac by its advertising agency 
(MacManus, John, and Adams) in which Cadillac’s competitive marketing position 
that year was discussed at length.  Surely, similar documents had to have been 
produced for much of the period covered by this paper, but could not be located – if 
indeed they still exist.  These were ephemeral documents, produced for a small 
                                                
4 Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors, (Garden City, New 
York: Anchor Books Edition 1972). 
5 John McDonald, A Ghost’s Memoir: the Making of Alfred P. Sloan’s “My 
Years with General Motors”  (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2002). 
6 United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) 
7 This concern was not illusory.  In addition to the DuPont Case, General 
Motors had to give extensive evidence to the Subcommittee on Retailing, Distribution 
and Marketing Practices and the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select 




number of people and useful for a short time, and then to be discarded – or perhaps 
deliberately destroyed to prevent them from being used by a federal prosecutor bent 
on ending the market dominance that the documents were designed to create. 
Another tantalizing, but incomplete, source of material is that distributed to 
Cadillac dealers.  These appear to have taken two forms; books of facts and figures 
designed to acquaint the dealers’ sales staffs with the products they were selling, and 
confidential booklets to assist the dealer to bring his/her marketing efforts into line 
with the division’s marketing plans.  My research at the G.M. Heritage Center and the 
library of the Antique Automobile Club of America revealed two of the former and 
one of the latter.  Surely, these must have been printed in much larger numbers for 
each year, but most were likely discarded when the model year to which they referred 
ended.  
Given the official attitude of secrecy, it is perhaps inevitable that corporate 
legends should develop, many of which have been repeated by the enthusiast press, 
and occasionally leaking into the academic realm.  Some of these legends have irect 
implications on the events described in this paper.  When it is necessary to use one of 
these stories, it will be identified as legend and attributed to its source as much as 
possible.  If there is reason to doubt the details contained within it, these doubts will 








Contribution to current scholarship 
Another issue that I face in my research is that the specific part of the 
automotive market that I discuss here, luxury cars, has been relatively littl  examined 
by academic historians.  That is not to say that the industry itself has been ignored.  
Since the publication of Unsafe at any Speed8, there has been a vein of scholarly 
literature that sees the automotive industry as a vaguely sinister force.  
Coincidentally, Nader’s work was published at about the same time that the need to 
do something about air pollution, much of it caused by automobiles, was reaching a 
national consensus.  It became fashionable for critics from various backgrounds to see 
the automobile and the cultural changes that it brought as detrimental.  The 
automobile industry, and most especially General Motors, had profited from this 
social recklessness, and their motives were therefore suspect.   This bias is found in 
both of James J. Flink’s books, his 1975 The Car Culture and the larger The 
Automobile Age (1990).9  More recently, James M. Rubenstein’s Making and Selling 
Cars picks up much of this theme while adding in monopolistic motives possessed by 
Sloan and his minions.  Interestingly, these works largely ignore the time period of 
this thesis.  They all discuss the early days of the industry, a period ending roughly 
with the demise of the Ford Model T, at considerable length.  They then spend very 
little time with the next three decades, except to decry the gradually increasing power, 
                                                
8 Ralph Nader, Unsafe at any speed; the designed-in dangers of the American 
automobile, (New York: Grossman, 1965). 
9 James J. Flink, The Car Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975).   
Interestingly, Flink dedicates The Car Culture “To the memory of my niece, Tiffany 
Ann Rudd.  Born December 11, 1969.  Killed while at play by an automobile on May 




size, and amount of chromium plate on cars as devices used by the industry to 
persuade the public to buy increasing numbers of vehicles. 
Another strain of scholarly literature focuses on the internal management 
policies of the major players in the industry.  Older treatments like Nevins and Hills’s
magnificent trilogy on the Ford Motor Company, as well as Chandler’s and Drucker’s 
works on General Motors focused primarily on the boardroom and methods of 
management decision-making.  More modern treatments like Robert Freeland’s The 
Struggle for Control of the Modern Corporation a d David Farber’s Sloan Rules 
continue this focus.  Valuable as it is, a focus on upper management leaves out too 
much of the story.  Sloan succeeded in his time, his place, and his firm.  However, 
one can question whether the policies and structures that made General Motors great 
would continue to serve it well, given that in the recent past Oldsmobile and Pontiac, 
two of the building blocks of Sloan’s “a car for every purse and purpose” policy have 
been jettisoned.  Others, notably Henry Ford II, Henry J. Kaiser of Kaiser-Frazer, and 
James J. Nance of Studebaker-Packard tried to build G. M.-like product structures in 
the first half of the 1950’s with a notable lack of success.  It should be clear, even 
from this rudimentary argument, that understanding the policy is not a sufficient 
explanation for the success that followed from it. 
David Hounshell moves the focus to the factory floor.  His argument that it is 
crucial to understand the systems of production is significant.  He cites the crucial
importance of General Motor’s development of flexible production techniques as 
opposed to Ford’s use of purpose-built machinery.  Ford’s practice, which it largely 




produced disastrous consequences when that product, the Ford Model T, was rejected 
by the public.  Houndshell does give us one indication that he realizes the limitations 
of his argument when he states, “First, Ford spent money as never before on 
advertising the new Model A. … Ford had discovered what General Motors already 
knew: advertising – major advertising – was a fundamental part of the changeover 
strategy.”10  It is tempting to wonder what Hounshell would make of Nicholas 
Dreystadt’s making Cadillac profitable in 1932-33 by simplifying its product 
offerings and mechanizing many of the hand-work processes.  Unfortunately, 
Hounshell’s work ends just as Dreystadt’s work was beginning. 
Other treatments, like Richard Tedlow’s New and Improved, Roland 
Marchand’s Advertising the American Dream and Sally Clarke’s Trust and Power 
focus on marketing as an important factor, perhaps the deciding factor, in corporate 
success.  I believe that these treatments are important steps in the right direction.  It is 
a truism in the world of business that nothing happens until somebody buys 
something.  It is crucial to understand the process by which consumers arrived t the 
decisions that gave G. M. pre-eminence among automobile manufacturers.   
Richard Tedlow spends a lot of space in his book looking at the competition 
between G. M. and Ford, basically telling the same story that Hounshell tells from a 
totally different perspective.  Hounshell tells us about the technical reasons that Ford 
was resistant to change; Tedlow tells us about the marketing consequences to that 
resistance.  However, Tedlow is also focused primarily on the bottom of the market.  
Although he gives some space to Sloan’s “car for every purse and purpose” product 
                                                
10 David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-




philosophy, the story that Tedlow really tells is the story of Ford v. Chevrolet.  
Cadillac receives scant notice; Ford’s entry in that price class, Lincoln, gets none.  
Also like Hounshell, Tedlow largely ends his narrative with the 1928 introduction of 
the Ford Model A to replace the venerable Model T. 
Roland Marchand’s treatment deals more specifically with advertising, rather 
than the whole field of marketing.  One of its many virtues is that it helps to create a 
vocabulary to classify the advertising of its period, 1920-1940.  As Cadillac’s 
advertising was taking shape during that period and largely remained in similar form 
until (at least) 1960, his work has been helpful and will be referred to a number of 
times in this work.   
Sally Clarke’s book is considerably broader than Marchand’s in that it focuses 
on many aspects of automobile retailing.  Her time span is very broad as well – 
starting with the industry’s infancy and running until 1965. Unfortunately, for my 
purposes, her work and mine do not intersect until page 186 of her excellent book and 
only the last forty pages are used to cover the period following World War II.  She 
also uses developments in product liability as a prominent sub-theme.  I have chosen 
not to deal with this aspect of automotive marketing for two reasons.  First, I am not a 
legal historian and any attempt to discuss regulation would tend to be rather 
superficial.  Second, according to Clarke’s treatment, the milestone case was 
MacPherson v. Buick (N. Y. 1916) which predates the period that I am covering.  
From that point, the law appears to have been relatively settled until the mid-1960s, 
except for three sets of events: the N.R.A., a flurry of activity around the time of 




in the mid-1950s.  The N.R.A. and the World War II-era regulations were relatively 
short-lived and I find little lasting change to have been occasioned by them.  Much 
the same can be said for the congressional investigations.  Many of the practices that 
Congress investigated were condemned by scrupulous dealers and manufacturers 
alike.  Congress did investigate certain credit practices, but – unlike other G. M. 
divisions – the use of credit played a relatively small part in the Cadillac story.  
According to Sally Clarke’s figures, over 80% of new Cadillac purchasers in 1954 
paid cash, compared with 37% of the market as a whole.11  Detailed study of these 
investigations would likely bear much fruit, but they are the stuff of another paper.12      
The luxury car arena was (and continues to be) hotly competitive.  The focus of 
the first section of this paper will be the nature and breadth of this competition, which 
will discuss the overall luxury car market in the 1926-1927 period.  At that time, 
Cadillac was only one among several competitors, many of which were just aswell 
established in the public mind as Cadillac was.  In the second section, the process by 
which Cadillac was able to weather the Great Depression and come out as the leader 
of the luxury car pack will be examined.  The third section will consider the first 
fifteen years following World War II and show Cadillac’s ascension frm mere 
leadership to dominance within its market segment. 
                                                
11 Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online, Table 
Df330-338.  
12 A brief but informative discussion of less-than-scrupulous dealer practices 






To my wife, Silvia, whose many sacrifices were essential to the completion of this 
work, and to my maternal grandfather, G. E. Mortimer and the childhood memories 





The value of any historical work is largely a reflection of the libraries and 
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Chapter 1: 1926-1927: On the eve of the flood 
 “Après moi, le déluge” – attributed to Louis XV 
If the pleasure seeking yet utterly confident world of the “Roaring Twenties” 
ever existed, it existed in the world of the luxury car market in the United States.  
Pictures of bejeweled fur-clad women alighting from the back of chauffeured town 
cars on the arms of their tuxedo-bearing escorts to go into nightclubs awash in illegal 
alcohol are parts of so many movies and newsreels so as to have become part of a 
kind of national mythology. 
 
Section 1 
Competition between brands of luxury cars 
Those few with the means to be cosseted in the back of cars costing over 
$3000 had a crowded field of automobiles from which to choose in 1926.  Most of 
those manufacturers were among the oldest members of an industry just coming out 
of adolescence.   Cadillac was neither the oldest nor the most popular, although with a 
model year production of 14,249 it was clearly a major player in its segment.  The 
independent Packard, whose 1926 production was approximately 25,000, had a solid 
lead on its G.M. competitor.13  Among its other competitors, Peerless produced 
10,430 units, Lincoln 7,711, Pierce-Arrow 5,682, Locomobile 2,586, Marmon 3,253, 
Stearns-Knight 987, and Duesenburg turned out two-to-three hundred.  Chrysler’s 
                                                
13 Production figures for the early auto industry are notoriously unreliable, 
especially before the standardization of the model year.  In the mid-1920s, Packard 
numbered its production according to self-named series numbers in which 1925 and 




Imperial 80, a new-comer to the group, produced about 3,000.14  There were a 
number of foreign choices as well, including the English Rolls-Royce15, the Belgian 
Minerva, the Italian Isotta-Fraschini, the Spanish Hispano-Suiza, and the German 
Mercedes-Benz.  For most of these brands, total production was miniscule by 
American standards, with only a fraction of their small numbers reaching the United 
States, often going to Hollywood where their novelty was appreciated by the 
nouveaux riches within the movie colony. 
 
Section 2 
“Design” before designers   
All these were largely hand-built cars.  All the manufacturers offered at least 
two engines and two wheelbase lengths.16   In all cases the more expensive series of 
cars rode on the longer wheelbase (somewhere between 133 and 143 inches) and had 
the more powerful motor.  Smaller series cars had wheelbases that ran between 116 
and 133 inches.  Wheelbase was an important contributor to the overall “look” of the 
car.  With bodies that were built on top of the frame, upright seating positions and 
riding wheels that were between 28 and 32 inches in diameter, the usual height of the 
top of a car body was going to be about six feet above the pavement.  The greater 
length of the wheelbases of luxury cars made their overall proportions appear to b  
                                                
14 Beverly Rae Kimes, et. al., The Standard Catalog of American Cars 1805-
1942 ,third edition (Iola, Wisconsin: Krause 1996)  pegs production at 9114 for the 
1926, 1927, and early part of the 1928 model years combined. 
15 From 1919 until the Depression, Rolls-Royce operated a satellite plant in 
Springfield, Massachusetts which, according to Rolls-Royce’s web site produced 
about 3,000 cars over its life-span.  
16 Wheelbase is a term given to the number of inches between the center of the 




more pleasing.  In comparison, the Model T Ford had 30 inch wheels and a wheelbase 
of 100 inches, giving it an appearance that can be described as spindly and 
unsubstantial. 
The sense of height was also accentuated by the presence of a panel often 
called the apron.  This panel filled the gap that would otherwise exist between the top
of the running board and the bottom of the body.  Basically, these covered the frame 
rails, adding four inches or so to the height of the body. 
Wheels were usually wooden “artillery” types or the more modern steel discs.  
Wire wheels were beginning to make an appearance during this period, and would 
become all but universal by 1930.  But the manufacturers of large cars still appearto 
have preferred the solidity of the more substantial wooden or disc wheels. 
All except Duesenburg offered factory built bodies, but custom coachwork by 
any one of the several custom body companies that did business in the U.S. were also 
available on all of them.  That being said, unless one went to a custom body shop, one 
would not get a car that had been designed by a stylist.  Only in 1928 would General 
Motors set up its “Art and Colour” studio as the first in-house design staff.  Untilthat 
time, bodies were laid out by body engineers.  The effect was that cars were taller, 
boxier, simpler, and less colorful than those of the early 1930s.  The fender lines 
tended to “hug” the tire more closely rather than flowing back at a more gradual 
angle.   
Windshields were usually placed at a ninety degree angle to the cowl, which 
in turn was just beginning to be set at the same visual level as the hood rather that 




top of the hood, which in earlier designs had been only as high as it needed to be to 
clear the engine.  All glass surfaces were flat, and would remain so for another two 
decades.  If the car was a sedan, the back of the body was often an uninterrupted 
plane, often totally vertical with only the slightest rounding when the back of the 
body met the top.  Only below the “Belt Line” (the line formed by the bottom edges 
of the side windows was there a curvature that allowed the back of the body to meet 







(Source for both: 1926 Handbook of Automobiles) 
 
As plain as the exteriors often were, the interiors were intended to convey 
sumptuous quality.  This was, after all, the part of the car that its owner would see the 
most.  A 1927 advertisement for Pierce-Arrow described it as having “Interiors in the 
manner of famous royal rooms” and went on to describe its “gold plated 
appointments and rich hand tailored upholstery. 
1926 Packard Eight Sedan 
 ( 






Pierce-Arrow Advertisment 1927 
(Source: Antique Automobile Club of America) 
 
If the car was designed to be chauffeur-driven, the interior carried a none-too-
subtle statement of the class structure.  While the owner was swaddled in fabric, 
usually some sort of wool broadcloth, the driver, who was still very likely to be 
exposed to the elements, rode on serviceable and durable black leather. 
When one went the custom body route the sky was the limit, provided that one 
had the means to pay for it.  Here the design work could actually become a bit 
bizarre.  One extreme example was featured in Lincoln’s 1926-27 catalog as the 
“Lincoln Coaching Brougham.”  Meant to recall “the Days when the Gentry of 
England and America found enjoyment in travel behind prancing horses,” this vehicle 
was a horseless carriage in the purest sense and was bound to capture attention.  It 
was intended to be finished in yellow and black with red pinstripes to “enliven the 
exterior.”  (Incidentally, at least one was actually built and is currently in he 





The Lincoln Coaching Brougham 
(Source: The Old Car Manual Project) 
 
Although it did not affect the external appearance of the cars, it should be 
pointed out that there were substantial differences in the power plants.  According to 
the N.A.C.C. scale in common use at the time, the Cadillac, with 31.25 horsepower, 
was the lowest powered of the 1927 luxury cars the most powerful being the Packard 
at 39.2.  Pierce-Arrow ran a close second at 38.4 hp.   The others all ranged from 33.8 
(Peerless) to 36 (Locomobile).  Among the less expensive cars, a different situation 
existed.  Cadillac used the same engine in both series, as well as the LaSallafter its 
1927 introduction, meaning that Cadillac had the most powerful of the junior series 
cars.  The lowest powered in that class was the Marmon with 24.2 hp.  The Packard 
and Pierce offerings both had 29.4 and the others ranged from 24.2 to 25.3.  Since the 




ratings may have made a greater difference, but only Imperial gave any substantial 
mention of the car’s top speed in their advertising.17 
 
Section 3 
The evolution of automotive advertising 
If any term could best be used to describe the totality of luxury car advertising 
in the mid- to late-1920s, that term would be “snob appeal.”   On a practical level, the 
luxury cars from each manufacturer are largely identical other than the differences in 
the output of the engines, mentioned above.  That is not to say that they looked 
exactly alike; there were detail differences in the lights, bumpers, radiator shells, 
available colors, ornamentation, interior fittings, etc., yet all these car presented very 
similar packages to their prospective owners.  Each needed an image that would 
impress the potential customer.  That job of fell to that most obvious of marketers, the 
advertising agents. 
The advertising and automotive industries can be said to have grown up 
together.  The earliest automobile advertising usually showed a small picture of he 
car without benefit of artistic style and made a few vague statements about it. 
 
Ad for the 1904 Autocar 
(Source: The Old Car Manual Project) 
                                                
17 Unless otherwise noted the figures in this section came from the 1926, 
1927, or 1928 issues of the annual Handbook of Automobiles produced by the 




As both advertising and automobiles developed over the next decade, the poor 
quality photos were increasingly replaced by better quality engravings and more 
words – lots more words.  
 
 
1913 Cartercar Ad 
(Source: The Old Car Manual Project) 
 
For some of the luxury manufacturers, this would remain as the state of the 
advertising art for decades to come.  Others would adopt advertising practices that 
were far more visually evocative with very few words in a style that is lmost modern 
in approach. 
Pierce Arrow’s advertising in particular was remarkably trend-setting, despite 
the fact that theirs were among the most conservatively designed cars of the period. 
The ads are artistically in keeping with the best illustrative work of the periods.  
Words are largely limited to the brand name of the product.  Virtually no information 




its interior appointments, or anything else other than the car’s general shape and 
color.  We are being offered a mood, a glance into the lives and aspirations of the sort












The images that these ads present were common images in luxury car 
advertising for decades.  To our eyes, the cars and clothing styles are antiqu , as are 
the social relationships (it has long since become more difficult to get good servants), 
but the form of the ads would not be out of place today.  
Conversely, when advertising their junior series car, the Series 80, Pierce-
Arrow felt it necessary to give the potential buyer more information, as though the 
middle-class buyer could not be trusted to know enough about the Pierce-Arrow 
Company’s reputation for quality.   
Pierce-Arrow Ads from 1910 and 1926 





Pierce-Arrow Series 80 ad 
(Source: New York Times, June 15, 1926, p. 14) 
   
 Here there are no vignettes of upper-class life, no fine art illustrations.  While
certainly not inexpensive, this is a car for someone who is emerging from the mass s.  
By reading it, we gain information about the car’s construction, interior, operating 
economy, and price.  This was a buyer who may be more prosperous than most, but 
was still concerned about getting a good deal.  Interestingly enough, no promises of 
social achievement were promised or implied.  The message is simple; buy a Pierce-






















Nine months later the approach was even more plebian.  Here the illustrations 
of the car are non-existent, attention was drawn to the brand name and the price.  
Furthermore, both ads mention (and one spotlights in bold text) payment terms.  
Prestige and quality are mentioned in both ads, but only in the fine print.  The 
implication was that Pierce-Arrow was willing to do business with such price-
conscious customers, but that they clearly believed that these need far more guidance 
in making the purchase than the more aristocratic customers with whom Pierce-
Arrow is clearly more comfortable. 
Only with Pierce-Arrow was the gulf between senior series and junior series 
marketing so obvious.  That is not to say that there were no such differences among 
Pierce-Arrow Series 80 ads   
(Sources: New York Times: left, April 24, 




other manufacturers, only that the high end of Pierce-Arrow’s advertising was so 
high, and its low-end advertising was so much more price conscious, that the extent to 
which Pierce-Arrow thought that it was moving down-market is clearly seen.   Far 















Certainly there are differences between these ads.  The potential Packard 
Eight customer was invited to make the Packard an expression of his/her own 
superior tastes, while the appeal to the customer for the Packard Six was far more 
practical, centering on the lack of depreciation together with a nod in the direction of 
easy maintenance.  However, Packard was willing to acknowledge that both classes 
Right, Packard Eight ad and left, Packard 
Six ad.  (Sources, New York Times, May 
27, 1925, page 54 and September 13, 




of its buyers might need some information about the actual price of the car, which in 
both ads was in small italic in a separate location away from the main body of the 
text.  And perhaps more importantly, a Packard Six buyer who happened to see both 
ads would have had no reason to believe that he/she was being talked down to. 
As will be seen in a later section of this thesis, Cadillac would decline to see 
even this level of distinction between its two markets, as its LaSalle advertising in 





Moving down-market in search of higher sales 
For most of the 1920s, the line that separated luxury cars from more plebian 
automobiles was just a shade under $3000, and sales had never been better.  Although 
1926 was a slack year, 1927 was rosy for Cadillac as 36,369 were produced (plus 
10,767 LaSalles).  This beat their previous best year, 1922, by a little over 10,000 
units.  During the teens, production in the 15,000 range had been normal.  The good 
fortune was not limited to Cadillac – in fact, it seems that Cadillac’s gains were 
among the lower in the segment, at least on a percentage basis.  Peerless reported a 68 
percent gain in the number of cars shipped in August 1925 over the figure for a year 




of 1926 over 1925.18  Packard’s system of recording production figures by the series 
of the automobile rather than by production year makes their gains more difficult to 
quantify, but in an article by Packard’s President, Alvan Macauley predicted that 
1926 auto production as a whole would be up by one-half million over 1925 for a new 
total of 4,500,000.  Just what “present indications” led him to that conclusion were 
unmentioned, but they were likely related to Packard’s own improving performance.19   
Indeed, six months later, Packard reported a net profit of $5,527,282 for the second 
quarter of 1926 which was over 40 percent higher than their performance for the 
second quarter of 1925.20  During the same quarter, Pierce-Arrow, a far smaller 
company, reported profits of $474,861, up from $364,714 the year before.21   
Marmon’s president reported early 1926 sales as running “well ahead of the same 
period last year.”22 
Within that context, it is interesting to note that all of the established brands 
were offering, or in the process of introducing, less expensive vehicles under their 
own name or as “companion” makes of cars that offered the quality of their more 
expensive brethren at a more popular price.  Sometimes these would prove to be 
relatively popular.  Packard, in particular, followed such a strategy successfully.  
From 1916 to 1923, Packard’s marquee vehicle was its 12-cylinder “Twin-Six” range
                                                
18 “Peerless Cars Gain in Volume of Sales”, Washington P st, September 10, 
1925, p. AU3 and “Peerless Reports Big Sales Increase”, Washington Post April 11, 
1926, p. A3 
19 Alvan MacCauley, “Motor Plants to Make More Automobiles This Year”, 
New York Times January 10, 1926, p A24 
20 “Packard Motor Profits Increase”, New York Times June 25, 1926, p 30. 
21 “Pierce-Arrow Earns $803,942”, New York Times July 27, 1926, p. 24 
22 “Sales of Marmons are Running Ahead of ’25, Report Says”, Washington 




which sold at prices that went from $2750 at the low end in 1916 to a high end of 
$5500 in 1923.  (Of course, it should always be remembered that custom coachwork 
could increase that price substantially.)  The companion “Single Six” – introduced in 
1921, certainly was not an inexpensive car, with prices generally in the $2500-3500 
range and it handily outsold the larger car.  By 1925-1926, the “Twin-Six” had been 
displaced by an inline eight cylinder engine, and the sales margin in favor of the six
increased even more substantially (40,358 vs. 7,912, a difference of about 5:1). 
The obvious lessons could not have been missed by other luxury car 
manufacturers, and most leapt to the idea.  In Late 1924, Pierce-Arrow presented its 
“Series 80” to supplement its top-of-the-line “Series 33.”   By 1926, the Series 80 was 
retailing for $2895 to $4045, which could only be considered inexpensive when 
compared to the $5250 to $7000 that the Series 33 cost.23  Locomobile came out with 
its “Junior Eight” with advertised prices between $1785 ands $2285 in 1925.  On 
November 22 of that same year, Peerless announced the advent of its 6-80 Sedan 
carrying a price of $1595.24  By mid-1926, the price of parking a Peerless in your 
driveway had declined even further, with the 6-80 being priced at $1395 to $1795, the 
6-72 for $1895 to $2995, and the big car –the Eight-69 pegged at $2995 to $3795.25  
After an abortive attempt to market a mid-range car under the Roosevelt banner,  
Marmon brought out its “Little 8” early in 1927, advertising it as “America’s Fir t 
Truly Fine Small Car,” and advertising its prices as “$1795 and upward – all under 
                                                
23 Advertisement, New York Times, 4-6-26, p 25 
24 “Peerless Produces New Lower-Priced Six Cylinder Car”, Washington Post 
November 22, 1925, page AU8. 




$2000.”26 Cadillac’s LaSalle, also introduced in 1927 will be discussed in more detail 
later.   
Of the established manufacturers, only Lincoln and Stearns-Knight declined to 
produce a car in the upper-middle price range.   One assumes that the talent pool at 
Ford was taken up with the process of ending the reign of the Model T in 1927 and 
the introduction of the Model A in 1928.  Stearns-Knight, having been purchased by 
John North Willys in 1925 to form the upper echelon of the Willys-Overland 
Company’s line-up, did not venture down-market, probably because Willys already 
had a mid-priced car.   
The other exception to the general pattern is the Chrysler Imperial.  This was a 
new player in 1926.  Walter Chrysler can be said to have started his pyramid in the 
middle.  Chrysler cut his teeth in the industry by successfully running Buick.  After
departing G. M. because he could no longer work William C. Durant, Chrysler took 
over the nearly-defunct Maxwell-Chalmers firm, gave the firm his name and started 
turning out mid-priced cars in 1924.  By 1926, Chrysler was building four series of 
automobiles with the “Imperial 80” at the top.  At the low end of the luxury car 
spectrum with 1927 prices of $2495 to $3595, that and the fact that the car was still 
primarily badged as a “Chrysler” rather than being a marque in its own right (a 
situation that went uncorrected until 1955) the image of the Imperial as a “true” 
luxury car would be suspect for most of its life-span.   
                                                




Chapter 2: The Age of LaSalle, 1927-1940 
Like its competitors, Cadillac was looking for a way to move down-market.  It 
would, however, take a very different route.  Where Packard, Locomobile, et al. 
would place their time-honored badges on less expensive automobiles, Cadillac 
created a totally new brand and then used its advertising to invest it with a dose of 
Cadillac prestige.  The decision was also made that the less expensive new car, called 
LaSalle, would be Cadillac’s test bed for new directions in design, while the snior 
models continued to appeal to a more conservative clientele.   
That there was a hole in the G. M. line up in the early 1920s was obvious, as 
can be seen from the following advertisement from the New York Times on 
November 12, 1925: 
 
In order to truly offer “a car for every purse and purpose,” the $1000 hole 
between Buick and Cadillac had to be filled.   That the top leadership at General 




claimed to have proposed that Cadillac prepare a model to fill that gap, although his 
autobiography is unclear as to the exact date (the context of the book would place it 
between 1921 and 1924).27  Chandler and Salisbury give credit for the proposal to 
Pierre S. duPont.28  Regardless of who exactly first saw the need, the fact that both 
Sloan and duPont perceived it is significant. 
 
Section 1 
Enter Harley Earl, stage west 
The development of LaSalle under the Cadillac umbrella would be significant 
for the entire corporation in a way that neither Sloan nor duPont can have foreseen, 
for it placed the process of creating the new car in the hands of Lawrence P. Fisher,29 
who had become the President and General Manager of Cadillac in 1925.  To design 
the new car, Fisher hired a young man from California, Harley Earl.  At the end of the 
project, Earl returned home, although he would not stay there for long.  The success 
of the new car brought Earl to the attention of Alfred Sloan, who would eventually 
make Earl the head of G.M. styling – a post he would hold until 1958. 
                                                
27 Sloan, My Years with General Motors, p 178. 
28 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. duPont and the 
Making of the Modern Corporation (New York: Harper and Row, 1971),  p 519. 
29 Fisher was one of the seven Fisher brothers who had come into General 
Motors through G.M.’s purchase of the Fisher Body Company.  G.M. had been a 
customer of Fisher Body for several years before purchasing a stake in the company 




The details under which the highly significant relationship between Sloan and 
Earl began are unclear, and the various versions of that story differ in detail.30  I  
appears that Fisher came into contact with Earl through Earl’s association with Don 
Lee, a leading Cadillac dealer in Southern California.  The Lee firm had made 
something of a name for itself by providing custom built Cadillacs to members of the 
recently established movie colony in Hollywood.  Earl had come into the automobile 
business through his father’s carriage and body building firm, which had been 
purchased by the Lee organization.  Fisher was apparently impressed by Earl’s design 
work for Lee and invited him to participate in the design of the new car.  
Styling was believed by Fisher and other top executives to have been a 
primary reason for the success of the 1923-1925 Packard.  According to Earnest 
Seaholm, Cadillac’s Chief Engineer from 1923-1943, Fisher was eager to take total 
control of styling away from the body engineers at Fisher Body.  The prejudic  of the 
body engineers was in favor of high quality and ease of production, while paying 
rather little attention to the aesthetics of the car.  By bringing in Earl, Fisher had to 
know that he was setting up considerable conflict between his new protégé and the
more established, more conservative Fisher Body men.31 
                                                
30 The narrative that follows is a composite made up of information from 
Sloan, My Year with General Motors, pages 312-317; Maurice D. Hendry, Cadillac, 
the Standard of the World 4th edition (Kutztown, Pennsylvania: Automobile Quarterly 
Books, 1990), pages 133-134;  Ed Cray, Chrome Colossus (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1980), pages 243-246;  and Stephen Bayley, Harley Earl (New York: Taplinger, 
1990), pages 23-33. 
31 Even in 1995, a journalist for Automotive News, Mary Conally referred to 
designers and body engineers as, “the Hatfields and McCoys of the auto industry.”  
Quoted by James M. Rubenstein, Making and Selling Cars, (Baltimore: The Johns 




The extent to which Earl’s position was tenuous in these early days was 
spelled out by Franklin Quick Hershey, a long-time G. M. designer: 
Harley was under the gun all the time.  When he first went there, 
everybody resented him because he hobnobbed with the Fishers.  The 
Fishers got him back there, and he was introduced to Sloan, and Sloan 
liked him, and Sloan liked what he did … but they were all jealous of 
him because they wanted to design the cars.  Well, engineers can’t 
design cars, and they thought, well, he’s a goody-good, doggoned 
pantywaist because he’s a doggoned artist, see?  Well, this was as far 
from the truth as it could be.  So then Fisher Body…their nose was out 
of joint, and they thought we’ll screw this guy the best way we can. 
So, when they designed the pregnant Buick… it had a little roll all 
down the…the roll ran down the hood right through the body at the 
belt line. … What happened was, when Fisher Body got a hold of it, 
once the design department got into Fisher Body, that was it.  I mean 
they could do anything they wanted to do, and they did.  They raised it 
two inches, which made the windows starey.  They did all kinds of 
things that ruined the original design, because I saw the original one.  
Harley kept the original one under cover there.  I saw it, eventually.  
He kept that for a long time.  So, they ruined the car.  Well, that 
became of the pry to help him to put Fisher Body in their place.  
Finally, the edict came through that, from now on, no change was to be 
made in the Fisher Body development unless it was made—the design 
part—unless it was made in the design department themselves.32  
  
Sloan’s appreciation of Earl’s success eventually gave Earl a power within the 
G.M. hierarchy that became legendary, and stories that illustrate it abound.  Typical is 
the following, related by David Gartman: 
One day in the early 1930s Harlow Curtice, the new general 
manager of General Motors' Buick Division, ventured to the third floor 
of the corporation's headquarters in Detroit, where the Art and Color 
Section was located. This was the corporate "beauty parlor," as some 
of Detroit's hard-boiled, no-nonsense automotive men referred to it, 
where the "pretty-picture boys" dressed up the automobiles that came 
off the engineers' drawing boards. The section was headed by a 
California transplant named Harley Earl, a style-conscious man given 
to wearing white-linen suits and purple shirts. But he was also a huge, 
powerful man who could curse, drink, and womanize with the best of 
                                                
32 Franklin Quick Hershey – Oral History at the Benson Ford Research 




the industry's engineers and production men. And he was determined 
to wrest the power to design cars away from them. 
Curtice eyed the decorations that Earl and his staff had hung on his 
forthcoming Buicks and did not like what he saw. He quickly got into 
a heated argument with Earl, who told him that he did not know a 
"damn thing" about style. After a few more expletives were 
exchanged, Earl suddenly fell silent and strode toward his office, 
motioning for Curtice to follow. He picked up the receiver of the 
phone on his desk and pushed the button that opened a direct line to 
the office of GM president Alfred Sloan. 
"Hello, Alfred, how are you?" Earl asked calmly. 
"How's Carol, Alfred? And how are the kids? Allright? That's 
good." Now the tone of Earl's voice grew notably harsher. 
"Alfred, I'm here in the Buick studio with that son of a bitch 
Curtice, and he seems to be a little confused. He can't tell who's in 
charge of Buick and who's in charge of Art and Color. I thought 
maybe you could straighten out his ass for me." 
Earl handed the phone to Curtice, to whom Sloan calmly stated: 
"Let him build anything he wants."'33 
 
Like many of these stories, there is reason to doubt some of the details.  
Sloan’s wife’s name was Irene, not Carol, and they had no children.  Even in the early 
1930s, Harlow Curtice was a real power within the corporation, and would become its 
president in 1953.  There is nothing in the record of their relationship that implies 
Curtice held any animosity toward Earl, as he might well be expected to have held 
toward the man who called the big boss so that Sloan could “straighten out his ass” 
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while Curtice was on the way up.34  On the other hand, the power that Gartman 
describes was apparently very real.  Earl did report directly to Sloan, rather than to 
the engineering chief or the heads of the various divisions.  In 1940, Earl would 
become a vice-president of the corporation.  
Earl embraced a design philosophy that would serve him and G.M. well over 
the next three decades.  Boiling his philosophy down to its simplest elements, he 
believed that automotive design should strive to make the car lower, longer, wider, 
and better detailed.  Much of that detail work would be seen on the front of the cars.  
Earl placed great emphasis on the frontal appearance, especially the grillwork, of his 
designs.  Early on, the structure of the radiator itself would limit Earl, but as will be 
seen, once the radiator shell was abandoned as a style element, Earl would use the 
grillwork to visually widen the vehicle.  Throughout Earl’s career, one can see the 
importance of the horizontal line, which tended to lower and lengthen the visual 
image of the car.  This emphasis can be seen even in Earl’s pre-G.M. work for Don 
Lee.  Some observers, especially Bayley and David Gartman35, emphasize a sense of 
theater that Earl acquired during his early career in California. 
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1922 Cadillac built by the Don Lee Company for Roscoe “Fatty” 
Arbuckle.  Note the horizontal strip which begins at the radiator and 
continues to the back of the car.  This attempt to use trim to visually 
lengthen the car would become one of Earl’s trademarks. 
Source: http://www.coachbuilt.com/bui/l/lee_don/lee_don.htm 
 
The importance of detail was another hallmark of Earl’s work that can be seen 
in the early years of his career and extending until his retirement.  He appears to h ve 
always been aware of the ways in which subtle decoration could reflect light.  Below
is a detail photograph of the headlamp of a 1932 Cadillac.  At first glance, it is simply 
a headlamp, but further investigation reveals at least two features whose only purpose 
is to reflect light and make the car more dazzling as sunlight reflects off of it.  The 
first is the groove that runs around the lens.  It could have simply been one unbroken 
curve extending from the lens to the edges of the “bucket” that encloses the bulb and 
the wiring.  Earl inserted an extra groove into the design, which serves no purpose 
other than to reflect light.  He also inserted a small crown into the top of the lamp for 
the same purpose.  These details served no function other than ornamentation.  They 
are very subtle – one could look at the car very closely and not notice them; however 
they do reflect light in such a way as to draw the eye to the front of the car that Earl 





1932 Cadillac Headlamp.  Author’s collection. 
 
Another important element of Earl’s philosophy was the use of color.  In this 
he was aided immensely by the recent development of Duco lacquer by the chemists 
over at DuPont.  Duco combined two virtues: the ability to present more vivid hues 
than previous formulas with relatively rapid drying time.  This development assised 
in the straightening of the production bottleneck that the painting and finishing of 
bodies had long presented.  The extent to which Earl was able to use this new 
capacity and its effect can be seen in the following article from Time magazine: 
The Laughing Cavalier is a sports roadster. King Henry VIII and 
The Blue Boy are all-weather phaetons. The Ceiling of the Sistine 
Chapel is an inside drive sedan. 
No gibberish are the above statements. 
They are easily explained by the fact that Cadillac-La Salle 
engineers together with Fisher and Fleetwood coachworkers have built 
17 automobiles with color schemes derived from paintings by 17 famed 
artists, from Botticelli to John Singer Sargent. The purpose was to use 
precisely the colors of the paintings; to give each color its proper value; 
to distribute the colors so that the result would be practical, utilitarian. 
The Cadillac-La Salle-Fisher-Fleetwood clientele have always been 
gourmets of the gasoline world. But these latest models require the very 
pink of passengerhood. Only the jolliest, most debonair of present-day 
gallants could fittingly adorn the La Salle-Fisher Laughing Cavalier. 
Students of the Hals painting have provided it with hood and cowl of 
Wissahickon green; lower body, fenders and gear of deep maroon; wire 
wheels, rear deck and body above moulding of Talina brown; roof and 




Regally imperious must be the wife who would venture forth with 
the Cadillac-Fleetwood King Henry VIII, sumptuously decorated in 
wine, red and silver after the Holbein portrait. 
For the personage with truly ecclesiastical majesty is the Cadillac-
Fleetwood Ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, Michael Angelical in dull 
reds, blues, greens, gold. 
Innumerable duets will find a luminescent cosiness in the La Salle-
Fisher special convertible town car, glistening with greens, pale yellows 
and silver after The Conversation by Watteau. 
And for the lady of devastating chic and ophidian fascination, who 
looks forward to penthouses rather than backward at palazzos, is the 
Cadillac-Fleetwood Art Moderne, a sleek transformable cabriolet in 
aluminum, black, copper, snakewood.36   
 
This use of color was also featured prominently in the 1928 Cadillac brochure, 
entitled “Color Creations from Nature’s Studios.”  Perhaps the most beautiful 
automotive catalog ever produced, the first inside page proclaims color to be 
“Nature’s Most Precious, Most Lavish Gift” and goes on to tie the new Cadillac to the 
very center of life itself as it enthused: 
NATURE, master artist, does not draw lines. She works with 
masses of color. It is the one skill she never relinquishes, the one that 
never fails her. Forms crumble. Motion comes finally to rest. Sound 
sinks to silence. Color alone abides. It may fade—it does not vanish. 
Here in the gay plumage of a bird, there in a gorgeous undersea 
fish; now in a rose resplendent in June sunlight, and again in the 
lavender shadows on January snows; in the fragile splendor of an 
afternoon butterfly and in the adamantine heart of a gem buried deep 
in the core of earth—everywhere and always, Nature hangs her earth 
with rich tapestries and veins its rocky bastions with vivid hues. It is 
the final, the glorifying touch, of her handiwork. Only when the 
mechanical structure is perfected does she take up her palette.  After 
the seed the flower; after the larva the butterfly.  
The motor cars pictured on these pages are, therefore, in a double 
sense, creations from Nature's studios. They signalize the perfecting of 
the inward structure. Their mechanisms – the Cadillac and LaSalle 
chassis and Fisher and Fleetwood coachcraft — mark the highest 
refinement of automotive design and construction. They are perfected 
as Nature perfects — to ultimate simplicity, economy, and efficient 
coordination. 
                                                




Therein lies their indisputable right to their unique color schemes 
—harmonies faithfully worked out from Nature. They reveal her 
consummate mastery of color—the most elusive and sole abiding 
thread in the fabric of life.  
 
Perhaps the most important consideration underlying Earl’s design philosophy 
was that he wanted G.M. to be on the leading edge of automotive styling, but not so 
far advanced that his style-conscious, but still relatively conservative clients (both 
among the corporate executives and the eventual purchasers of the cars) would find 
the eventual products jarring.  It can be said, therefore that much of Earl’s best work 
was derivative.  For the 1927 LaSalle, Earl borrowed heavily from the Hispano-Suiza, 
(a fact that Earl himself acknowledged) a very low production French car.37
 
The LaSalle design patent, credited to both Harley Earl and Cadillac Chief Engineer 
Seaholm. 
(Source http://www.carofthecentury.com/harley's_la_salle.htm)  
 
 
In this respect, Earl was not alone.  One of the few major automobile 
designers of the period who never worked for Earl was Raymond Loewy, an 
independent industrial designer who worked extensively for Studebaker from the late 
1930s through to the early 1960s.  Sally Clarke points out that Loewy’s attitude was  
similar to Earl’s, pointing out that Loewy, “tried to entice consumers with something 
                                                




new – but not so new as to startle his clients’ shoppers.  Market research helped 
determine what customers thought of as comfortable or conventional, and, given their 
conventions, Loewy claimed to design products in keeping with his principle of being 
‘the most advanced yet acceptable.’”38 
Earl’s success with the new LaSalle was immediately apparent.  The unnamed 
reviewer from the trade publication Motor noted that, “When the writer first laid eyes 
on these new models … his first impression was that here was just about the most 
beautiful line of cars that he had ever seen.”  He referred to the overall effect of the 
design as “European.”   Pressing himself to isolate those factors that made it so 
striking, he specifically mentioned the “sweeping, low-crowned one piece front 
fenders,” the “high, low-bottomed nickel radiator,” the “bullet-nosed nickeled 
headlamps mounted on nickel plated brackets”, the “low, broad but graceful [radiator] 
filler cap,” the “streamline crease” found on the fenders, headlamps, radiator, and 
radiator cap, as well as the fact that the frame was sufficiently low so that the 
floorboards were a mere twenty inches from the ground.39 
W.L. Carver, writing for Motor Age, amplified this assessment and drew 
attention to the color scheme in which the hood and cowl were painted in a darker 
shade than the body from the leading edges of the front doors to the back of the car.40  
This unusual use of color set the car apart from the rest of the U.S. car market as well 
as from its cousins in the Cadillac line.  It was also seven inches shorter than the 
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standard Cadillac, having a wheelbase of 125 inches as opposed to Cadillac’s 132.  
The use of color and the smaller wheelbase was calculated to give the new car a more 
sporting, less formal appearance than the senior car. 
The importance of the LaSalle has not been overlooked by modern 
commentators, either.  English design critic Stephen Bayley sums up its appeal to its 
target audience: 
Its appearance was entirely new: sharp corners had been excluded in 
favour of warmly curved junctions, disparate elements had been 
harmonized into a unified whole, and as a hint of the chief concern in 
car structure that was to remain Earl’s for the next thirty years, the 
silhouette had been lowered so that the car gave an impression of 
elegance and expressed a potential for speed. 
 
 
Section 2  
The men behind Cadillac advertising and their philosophy 
Throughout most of the period covered by this paper, direction of Cadillac 
advertising was led in turn by two of these comfortable upper-middle-class men, 
Theodore F. MacManus (1872-1940) and James R. Adams (1898-1956).  The two 
men, together with W. A. P. John, formed MacManus, John & Adams, with 
MacManus bringing the Cadillac account into the firm.  Exactly when MacManus 
turned supervision of Cadillac advertising over to Adams is subject to some 
conjecture.  The Advertising Hall of Fame’s website credits Adams with “supervising 




about 1926.  This seems highly unlikely, since the same source says that he was with 
Campbell-Ewald until partnering with MacManus in 1934.41 
Assembling a chronology from his book, Men, Money, and Motors, it appears 
that MacManus’s association with Cadillac began shortly before Henry Leland sold 
Cadillac to General Motors in 1909.  According to this account, MacManus got the 
account over other, more experienced advertising agencies when it turned out that a 
poem he had written was a favorite of both Leland and Leland’s son Wilfred.42  With 
the possible exception of the period from 1931-1934,43 MacManus and the successive 
firms into which the MacManus agency was absorbed would do Cadillac’s 
advertising until 2006. 
MacManus himself is something of a legend in the advertising community.  
His most famous work is a Cadillac ad that ran only once, in the Saturday Evening 
Post on January 2, 1915.  Entitled “The Penalty of Leadership,” it has been described 
as “perhaps one of the greatest advertisements and most inspiring pieces of business 
literature ever written.”44  Cadillac was never mentioned in the text of the ad, 
although its logo appeared in the border (See Appendix A).   In his advice manual, 
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More Power to Advertising (1937), Adams asserted that “To this day Cadillac cars are 
being sold on the strength of an advertisement written more than twenty years ago, 
and entitled ‘The Penalty of Leadership.’”45   
A modern reader is likely to look at that ad and wonder how it can possibly 
have been so effective.  The text is densely packed; there is no artwork except the 
border around the text; it transmits no emotional charge to the casual onlooker leafing 
idly through the magazine.  However, on reading it, one knows exactly to whom it is 
addressed.  It is easy to imagine the careworn captain of industry or owner of a 
prosperous small business reading this ad and saying internally, “Those people know 
what it is like to be me.  They understand what I am up against, and why I am up 
against it.”  A bond was formed.  In 1927, MacManus was able to quote an unnamed 
Cadillac President as saying, “Advertising has put something into the Cadillac that 
was not built in the factory.  I do not know what it is, but I know that it is there, and it 
had made this the most uniquely valuable motor car property in the world.”46   The 
car was sold because the ad complimented the reader more than it complimented the 
product. 
Theodore MacManus’s philosophy of advertising sprang from a series of solid 
core beliefs.  First among these was what he called the “Metaphysics of Advertising” 
which had its basis in, “a balance between product, and producer and consumer that 
must be a true balance, one that does not deceive.  Its essence is honesty as a principle 
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as well as a policy.”47  It was, in his opinion, this honesty that set publicity apart from 
propaganda that was based on untruth or half-truth.  Springing from this base was his 
“advertising formula.”  This first premise in this formula was the idea that consumers 
possessed subconscious minds that were being constantly influenced by the various 
stimuli to which the individual was subjected.  The job of the advertiser48 was to raise 
those influences from being largely accidental to “make it at least semi-scientifi .”  
The first step in accomplishing this end had to lay with the manufacturer who had to 
determine, as simply as possible, what he/she wanted the public to believe about the 
product.  A single sentence served to encapsulate the virtues of the product and/or the 
policies of the firm in such a way that it would be “so clear and so convincing that it 
will carry conviction every time it is repeated49.”  
In MacManus’s world, that single sentence, that core idea, would be repeated, 
and repeated often.  It would, in fact, form the core of the reputation that the 
advertiser would build for the manufacturer through the advertising.  In this respect, 
repetition was a key element.  The core concept would need to be repeated so often 
that the consumer would internalize it, coming to see is as his/her own carefully 
thought-out opinion.  To be accepted, it was important that the concept compliment 
the consumer’s other beliefs, to fit comfortably into his/her frame of referenc .   
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This belief placed MacManus in direct opposition to those advertisers who 
captured the consumer’s attention by pointing out their deficiencies (real or 
imagined), and then presented the manufacturer’s product as the cure/preventative.  
The purchase a Cadillac, MacManus implied, would convey to the world the kind of 
person that you were (or aspired to be).  The goal was never presented as keeping th  
other members of the Country Club from laughing at you behind your back. 
This was a slow-growth policy.  Cadillac advertising would occasionally 
mention the technical aspects of the product in a general way, and pricing would take 
a more prominent place during the 1930s, but the key appeal of Cadillac advertising 
would remain largely stable for decades.  “Buy a Cadillac,” the ads seemed to say, 
“because this is the car that will show the world the kind of superior person that you 
are.” 
This process would yield huge rewards because it produced an incredible 
amount of customer loyalty.  As Adams would put it, 
  A business is safe and sound and durable only when it has back of 
it a safe and sound and durable public opinion. 
The man who takes advantage of your bargain, or who responds to 
your loud claims and ballyhoo, is not your friend and you cannot 
depend on him. 
He will desert you tomorrow for a more attractive offer.  
Your only chance is to keep everlastingly at him with bargains and 
claims; and you do that only at the expense of your own ruin. 
How different the customer who buys from you because he 
respects you and genuinely admires the product you build! 
He is your friend.  You can trust him.  He will be back again and 
again.  He is the very cornerstone of business success.50 
 
                                                




MacManus and Adams were not lone voices trying to persuade a reluctant 
client to embrace the value of advertising.  Alfred Sloan placed great value on 
divisional advertising.   He also saw its value in building an image for the company as 
a whole.  Sloan worked closely with Barton, Durstine, and Osborn to develop a broad 
campaign as early as 1922.51  Pamela Walker Laird gives Sloan a great deal of credit, 
saying that, “Sloan brought fashion into the market. … Sloan deliberately explored 
design and advertising for profit, rather than for the purpose of enhancing anyone’s 
personal identity – other than the consumer’s.”52  By  1923, General Motors was the 
single largest national magazine advertiser.53   Given the fact that the corporation had 
faced near-bankruptcy only two years earlier, the importance that Sloan placed on 
advertising shines out in even greater clarity. 
 
Section 3 
Pricing   
Cadillac’s marketing success was built on three elements, styling, skillful 
advertising, and pricing.  We have seen how the first two played out in the 1927 
introduction of the LaSalle.  It is now time to turn to the third element. 
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The genesis of the LaSalle brand was born in the price gap between Buick and 
Cadillac, as shown at the beginning of this section.  The advertised spread in LaSalle
pricing was initially rather small, from $2495 to $2685.  Advertised 1927 Cadillac 
prices started at $2995 and could go way up from there, although the available 
advertisements do not mention a top price.54  Buick prices ranged from $1195 to 
$1995.55  While LaSalle did not entirely fill the $1000 price gap between Buick and 
Cadillac, it did occupy the middle of that gap. 
 
Section 4 
A policy of gradual improvement as the model years rolled along 
The 1927 season for LaSalle was an abbreviated one, since the car was 
introduced in March.  Even so, 10,767 were sold – a healthy figure when one 
considers that Cadillac sold only 14,249 vehicles for all of the 1926 model year.  
Nineteen twenty-seven also would be the beginning of very good times for the senior 
nameplate as, as 36,369 Cadillacs were sold.   The combined total of over 47,000 
units far eclipsed Cadillac’s earlier best year, 1922, with production of 26,296. 
If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, G.M. complimented itself when 
many of the LaSalle’s styling touches were used on the 1928 Cadillac as well.56  By 
this time, Earl was in the process of setting up the industry’s first in-house design 
studio, dubbed the Art and Colour Section.  This set the pattern that the division 
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would follow throughout the LaSalle’s short lifespan.  LaSalle would be the sportier, 
more avant-garde of the pair while Cadillac would be slightly more conservative, 
longer, and more somber in color.  Mechanically, they were very similar, LaSalle 
usually sharing the drivetrain of the least expensive Cadillac.  Every year from 1928 
through 1933, the Cadillac division moved gradually to produce a car that was 
slightly lower and longer; at least visually, if not in fact.   These mild styling upgrades 
would be accompanied with mechanical improvements as engines grew more 
powerful, braking technologies improved, and transmissions became smoother.  This 




Sixteen Cylinders   
There would be one significant exception to this policy of gradual 
improvement during this period, but this time it was in the realm of engineering 
instead of styling.  Cadillac leapfrogged the entire industry with the introduction of a 
V-16 engine in 1930.   
The project was apparently kept secret until the car’s introduction.  Given the 
standard development times in the industry at the time, work on the engine must have 
begun by early 1928, but I found no mention of it in the motoring press until the 
actual introduction.  This secrecy served two purposes.  First, it maximized the impact 
that accompanied the introduction.  Second, keeping the new engine a secret 




purchase.  The logic is simple.  Someone who wanted a top-of-the-line car in 1929 
might well have decided not to buy had he/she known that a substantially better car 
was coming along in 1930. 
If ever an automobile engine could be called beautiful, this one was.  There 
was an Art Deco sensibility in the look of the engine with its smooth surfaces, valve 
cover decorations, and the fact that special shrouds were designed to keep engine 
wires out of sight.   Everything gave the appearance of being neat, in order, and 
efficient.    
 




Of course, the V-16 was a very expensive automobile.  Cadillac advertised the 
price range as starting out at $5350 for the roadster and going up to $15,000.  The 
usual varieties of body style were available in virtually any color combination that the 
customer desired.  
The advertising campaign was incredibly simple and thoroughly understated.  




related to travel appeared in the top of the page, but are almost too small to have any 
impact.  The most important part of the copy of the ad is the phrase “SIXTEEN 
CYLINDERS.”  The ads conveyed a Cadillac that was thoroughly modern; its ew 
engine destined to make it a part of history, and its owner could expect to be 
thoroughly comfortable in the knowledge that this was a superior car that would 
accent his/her position in society.  The car was revolutionary, the ads seem to say, 








1930 Cadillac V-16 advertising.  Left to right, American Motorist – August 1930, 
Good Housekeeping – July 1930, Sources – Cadillac-LaSalle Club Library and 
Antique Automobile Club of America Library. 
 
 
Initially, the V-16 was successful, with over 3,000 sold in 1930 and 1931.57  
Late in the 1930 season, Cadillac introduced a shortened version of the engine with 
twelve cylinders.  Instead of using the V-16’s 148” wheelbase, the V-12 borrowed the 
140” frame that had supported the Cadillac V-8 since 1928.  The V-8 was then moved 
to the LaSalle’s 134-inch chassis.   Automotive Industries detailed the process through 
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which the V-12 was formed, “The new 12-cylinder engine is virtually a replica of the 
16, with two cylinders eliminated from each bank.  On the other hand, axles, 
transmissions and clutches are virtually identical with those of the Cadillac V-8.  
External body construction … is notably Cadillac V-8.  Body interiors, on the other 
hand, are more of the character of the V-16, interior appointments being by 
Fleetwood.”58  This would become a typical pattern for Cadillac and all of G.M. for 
years into the future – production would fill a newly perceived niche by combining 
already designed and tooled parts in a new combination.   Prices for the V-12 began 
at $3795, slightly more than the most expensive V-8, to $4895.  With LaSalle 
factored in, a Cadillac dealer could offer the public three different engines, thr e 
different chassis, a full array of factory and custom built bodies, all at prices ranging 
from $2490 to $15,000.  Had the conditions of the 1920s gone on forever, Cadillac 
was poised for huge gains in market share.   
 
Section 6 
Responding to stern realities 
Of course, the good times didn’t last.  Sheer momentum carried Cadillac along 
for a time, but the decline in sales as the Great Depression spiraled downward was 
impressive.  It is easy to forget that what we all call the Great Depression was not 
always thought of as such.  Early in 1930, Time Magazine referred to “the hazards of 
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a possible business recession.”59  Calendar year 1929 saw sales of 36,598.  The 
following year sales were off by more than a third – to 22,559.  Even so, that number 
was better than Cadillac had done in any year prior to 1926.  By 1931, 1932, and 
1933, the 1930 numbers would have filled the Cadillac sales force with nostalgia as 
sales declined to 15,012, 9153, and 6736 respectively. 
The response of the luxury car industry to the Great Depression can be broken 
down into two phases.  The first phase, from 1930 to 1934 or 1936 depending on 
manufacturer – Packard and Lincoln held out longer than Cadillac or Imperial.  
During this phase, those at the top of the price range competed more actively for the 
shrinking pool of buyers by improving their offerings.  Cadillac’s V-16 lost its 
exclusivity in 1931 when Marmon brought out its own sixteen-cylinder behemoth.  
Packard and Lincoln marketed V-12 engines in 1932.   
Nineteen thirty-two was also the year in which this first response to the 
Depression reached its zenith with virtually every car in every price range receiving, 
at the very least a facelift to make the cars look more streamlined, particularly by 
slanting the windshields, giving the radiator shells a vee-like design when viewed 
from overhead, and elongating the fenders.  H.A. Tabantous noted in the New York 
Times that “practically every engine in 1932 has more power than the corresponding 
one of last year.”  Alfred Sloan gave the 1932 models his stamp of approval when he 
was quoted in Time as saying “We know that we have the first lien on the purchaser’s 
budget; that the motorcar is the last thing that the individual gives up….  The new 
offerings this year unquestionably represent greater value than ever before….  My 
                                                




own belief … is that we will enjoy a somewhat better year than in 1931.60  Even 
today, enthusiasts of pre-World War II American cars are likely to point to 1932 
models in all price classes as being especially desirable. 
Perhaps, if Herbert Hoover had been correct in predicting that prosperity was 
just around the corner, this would have been the correct response.  As it was, having 
the “first lien of the purchaser’s budget” was not a secure position as the New Deal 
made its debut.   Cadillac knew that changes had to be made.   They were not the only 
ones.  At Marmon and Stutz, 1932 would be the end of the line.  Packard’s new 
“Light Eight” came nowhere near to achieving the goals its producers pinned upon it.  
By the time that industry-wide 1932 production proved to be about 40% lower than 
lackluster 1931 had been,61 it was too late to make major changes for 1933, but both 
Cadillac and Imperial poised themselves to go deeply down-market for 1934. 
Relatively new to the scene was Cadillac’s general manager, Nicholas 
Dreystadt.  Fisher had been something of an artist, or at least an art fancier.  Dreystadt 
was a production engineer.  He would imprint a new way of doing business that 
would both go a long way toward assuring Cadillac’s success, both in the marketplace 
and within the G.M. corporate structure. 
 Dreystadt was something of an anomaly in the ranks of G.M. management, 
first coming to the U.S. from Southern Germany as a teenage apprentice on the 
Mercedes racing team.  Management theorist Peter Drucker became a quainted with 
Dreystadt while doing research on what would eventually become his 1946 book 
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Concept of the Corporation.  Years later, he asserted that Cadillac was inches from 
liquidation when Dreystadt came on the scene.62  Drucker gave Dreystadt, whom he 
very much admired, credit for two innovations that may well have saved Cadillac 
from the fate of Pierce-Arrow, Marmon, and Stutz. 
The first of these was in the realm of marketing.  Cadillac apparently had a 
policy of not selling directly to African American customers, no matter what their 
ability to pay.  Dreystadt had noticed that these well-heeled customers would employ 
a white man to make the purchase for them, paying a substantial commission to the 
buying agent.  Having noticed this, Dreystadt ended the practice and went to some 
lengths to cater to this market of entertainers, realtors, doctors, etc. thereby 
substantially increasing Cadillac sales.  While this account certainly cou d be true, I 
believe there is room for doubt.  There is an element of a story that is simply too good 
to be true, portraying Dreystadt’s marketing philosophy as a prototype of Branch 
Rickey’s hiring of Jackie Robinson to play for the Brooklyn Dodgers.  I see nothing 
in Cadillac’s advertising to support this change, although information provided to 
dealers during this period is in incredibly short supply.  In justice to Drucker and 
Dreystadt, it is plausible that this change was done very quietly to avoid antagonizin  
white customers.  Certainly, it is possible that a few telephone calls to dealers in cities 
with substantial African-American middle classes could have effected the desired 
change. 
The second of these changes is in the realm of production.  Until Dreystadt’s 
accession, Cadillacs had been produced in the same sort of craft-oriented shop as 
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those in which its competitors were produced.  The result of these labor-intensive 
practices was that Cadillac was barely profitable even during its best years, and was 
hemorrhaging money during the Depression.  Dreystadt recognized that modern 
mass-production techniques could be every bit as reliable as the previous methods 
and implemented them in Cadillac’s factories.  The result was that a Cadillac cost 
little more to produce per unit than a Chevrolet while it carried a far higher pric  – 
making it vastly more profitable.63 
This is a plausible tale.  The set of production practices often called “Fordism” 
had never been an acceptable model for small output operations like Cadillac.  
However as David A. Houndshell points out, by the early 1930s, they had largely 
given way to a mode called “Flexible Mass Production.” Such a system would have 
been useful to luxury car manufacturers who needed to produce a wide variety of 
models, none of which would be produced in large numbers.   Having access to the 
resources of General Motors, this was especially advantageous to Cadillac.64   
Another significant change giving this story credence is the fact that the 
gradual changeover from a “composite” system of body manufacture was going on.  
The composite system was one in which sheets of steel forming the outer skin of the 
car body were secured to a wooden frame.  In the mid-1930s, the composite body was 
giving way to the all steel body.  The earlier system, while amenable to Fordist 
production techniques, was also open to being used by a small custom shop using a 
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large amount of skilled labor.  This inherent flexibility meant that such a small shop 
was easily able to embrace modern style trends and produce a few examples of a wide 
variety of models.  Just how broad the model line could be is seen in 1929’s The Book 
of Fleetwood in which seventeen types of custom bodies were listed as being 
available, each being open to alteration by the eventual customer.  The all-steel-body 
used frames made by huge presses rather than by skilled carpenters.  This made 
flexibility rare and vastly more expensive.  Under these conditions, keeping up with 
new trends in styling could only be done by those, like General Motors, who had the 
financial resources to make expensive tooling changes on a regular basis.  Of the few 
surviving independent luxury car manufacturers, only Packard was able to keep up, 
and then only by going far more deeply down market than Cadillac ever would.  
(Interestingly, Mercedes-Benz would continue to produce a composite bodied car 
until 1955, twenty years after the practice was abandoned by G.M.) 
Dreystadt actually took over the reins at Cadillac from Lawrence Fisher on 
June 1, 1934.  By that time, Cadillac’s own move down-market was at least partially 
underway.  Throughout the period from 1930-1933, LaSalle’s pricing structures had 
been largely consistent, with its least expensive model retailing at a point somewhere 
between $2,200 and $2,500.  However, over the same period, the price of the least 
expensive Cadillac declined considerably – from $3,295 to $2,695.  By 1933, only 
fifty dollars separated the most expensive LaSalle from the least expensive Cadillac.  








Design saves LaSalle 
The decision to keep LaSalle is another enduring part of automotive myth.  
According to this oft-retold but unverifiable tale, the decision to drop LaSalle had 
already been made when Harley Earl showed top G.M. management the design that 
he had prepared for it.  Dazzled by the design, management reversed itself and 
ordered the 1934 LaSalle into production.65    
Regardless of its exact gestation process, the 1934 LaSalle was a major 
departure from its immediate predecessor.  The overall style of the car could be 
described as conventional streamlining.  The radiator grille, which had by 1933 
become a steel shell placed over the working radiator, still had a vertical emphasis, 
but Earl visually distanced it from its traditional shape by narrowing it significantly.  
The vertical axis was emphasized by the adoption of “headlamps of airfoil shape,”66 
the addition of wide “catwalks” linking the sides of the grille and hood to new fenders 
of pontoon shape extending back nearly the entire length of the hood, and a bumper 
with two thin blades that resembled nothing so much as the wings of a World War I 
biplane.  As if to extend the airplane metaphor further, the bumper was joined to the 
body by two fuselages which were spring loaded to allow the bumper to move back in 
a very minor collision without damage to the brackets mounting it to the body.   
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Under the hood, the engine of the car actually seemed to be a technological 
step backwards.  Instead of being powered by the Cadillac V-8, as it had been since 
its 1927 introduction, the 1934 LaSalle had a straight eight cylinder engine of 
Oldsmobile design. 
This combination of progressive, but not radical styling and conventional 
engineering would be so much a part of Cadillac and G.M. marketing that this car 
will be compared at length with its competition.   
Stylistically, the 1934 LaSalle has much in common with a far less expensive 
automobile introduced two years earlier, the Graham “Blue Streak.”  The Graam 
was styled by one of the few designers who is said to rival Harley Earl, Amos 
Northup.   Its styling featured the same sort of sloping radiator and full fenders that 
the LaSalle did.  Historian of Automotive Design Nick Georgano posits that, “For 
anyone accustomed to cars of the later 1930s, it is hard to understand the importance 
of the 1932 Graham.  Suffice it to say that it could easily have passed for a 1935 car, 
in an age when design was changing very rapidly.”  It retailed in a price rang  
between $1,000 and $1,300, and likely would have sold well in better times.  But it 
was that most unkind of years, 1932, and fewer than 10,000 were produced. 
 
1932 Graham Blue Streak 
Source: Encyclopedia of American Cars, p 493. 
 
Whether or not Earl took inspiration from Northup’s work is uncertain.  The 




makes it unlikely, but possible.  Earl almost certainly would not have admitted 
borrowing design themes for the new LaSalle from a mass produced car in the 
Oldsmobile price range, but the derivative nature of much of Earl’s work has already 




The radical alternative 
A far more advanced contemporary of the new LaSalle from which Earl most 
definitely did not draw was the new Chrysler Airflow.  That the Airflow was very 
significant from an engineering standpoint is a point that many Automotive 
historians, both enthusiast and academic, will acknowledge.  James J. Flink sums up 
both its virtues and the reasons for its lack of success well: 
Powered by an eight-cylinder, 4.4-liter engine, the Airflow in motion 
developed 40 percent less drag than competing models. The five-
passenger Chrysler sedan sold for a moderate $1,345. It was one of the 
first cars to feature welded unitized construction, in which the body 
and chassis frame are built as an integral structure, rather than the 
body being a separately built structure bolted onto the chassis frame in 
assembly. Unitized construction permits greater rigidity for a given 
weight and a roomier passenger compartment for a given width of 
body. The full aerodynamic shape of the Airflow combined a deco 
grille, headlights mounted flush in the front fenders, a split slant 
windshield, seating entirely within the wheelbase, and an integral 
trunk. Although the Airflow was a superior automobile in all respects, 
it was far too revolutionary for consumers. Fewer than 54,000 units 
were sold before it was withdrawn from production in 1937. Chrysler 
hurriedly brought out conservatively designed Airstream models in 
1935 and after its Airflow experience remained the most conservative 
of the Big Three in styling policy for several decades.67 
 
                                                




Some contemporary commentators were far less guarded.  Harper’s editor 
Frederick Lewis Allen said that the car was, “so bulbous, so obesely curved as to efy
the natural preference of the eye for horizontal lines.”68 
 
Chrysler Airflow Publicity Picture 
Source: Gartman, Auto Opium, page 122 
 
If Earl had harbored any desire to be on the automotive avant garde in 1934, 
Chrysler’s experience with the Airflow likely cured him of it.  The lesson was as clear 
to him as it was to the rest of the industry: engineering excellence did not sell car , 
styling that fit the car into the tastes of current consumers did.  Earl would always 




Once again, advertising follows styling 
MacManus and Adams were quick to pick up on the themes presented by the 
design of the new offering as a more streamlined look also came to predominate in 
LaSalle’s advertising.  This is not to say that the approach was completely new.  Both 
the 1933 and 1934 ads shared an overall theme in common with each other and with 
the other LaSalle advertising shown above.  The themes of rich people at play were 
                                                




prominent.  Therewas a sense of athleticism.  Pictures were far more important than 











Source for both ads – Antique Automobile Club of America Library 
 
The differences were also marked.  The antique print quality of the 1927 
advertising seen earlier had yielded to artwork of a far more contemporary sensibility 
by 1933.  The 1934 artwork was minimalist.  The customer could not focus on the 
beauty of the background as he/she could in the earlier ads.  The car stood by itself in 
all of its stark modernity.  In other ads, photographs replaced drawings.  These 
photographs feature only the front of the car from a variety of dramatic angles, 
straight on, overhead, and very low. 
Another difference between the 1934 ad and the earlier effort was the 
prominence given to the price of the car.  Price information had almost always been a 
part of LaSalle ads, but it had always been subordinate to other information, 
appearing at the bottom of the earliest ads or camouflaged in 1933, as if to say, “Here 
is a smart car that incidentally is less expensive than other smart cars.” In 1934, the 




copy.  The shift it subtle, but the message has become, “Lucky lady – here is a 





Photography from 1934 LaSalle Ads (Right – Motor, May 1934, p. 73 ; Center – 
Automotive Trade Journal, October 1934, p. 181; Left – Motor, March 1934, p. 65)  





Pricing strategy dooms the LaSalle 
Even after all that has been said about styling and advertising, it is possible 
that the most important difference between the 1933 and 1934 LaSalles was the price.  
As mentioned earlier, LaSalle had been introduced to give G.M. a car that would 
retail in the low-to-mid-$2,000 range.  The price range of the new LaSalle w s $1,495 
to $1,595.  This made the LaSalle a competitor with the Series 60 Buick, and 
considerably less expensive than Buick’s 90 Series.  As if to accentuate the LaSalle’s 
demotion, the 1934 (as well as 1935 and 1936 models) carried a straight eight engine 
sourced from Oldsmobile.  A narrower model line-up reflected the price range with 
only four offerings; two- and four-door sedans, a coupe, and a convertible.  Gone 
from LaSalle’s line were the Fleetwood bodied long-wheelbase sedans and 
limousines that had been featured earlier.  On the other hand, sales over 1933 more 




LaSalle’s price decline did not end in 1934.  The advertised entry price in 
1935 was $1,225, $1,175 in 1936, and $995 (later increased to $1,095) in 1937.  This 
price decline was paralled by a decline in LaSalle’s fortunes overall.   By 1937, 
Cadillac was advertising prices starting at $1,555 for a car carrying the full prestige of 
the senior offering.  That same year the Buick Roadmaster sedan retailed at $1,518.  
The price gap that had provided LaSalle with its genesis simply no longer existed.  
Nor, after 1934, did the design exclusivity that gave LaSalle much of its luster.   
While the 1934 Cadillac had been a slightly more conservatively styled car 
than the LaSalle was, in 1935 Cadillac picked up most of the LaSalle’s styling cues. 
From that point on, the LaSalle would simply be a cheaper Cadillac with a narrower 
grille.  LaSalle would regain some of its status when it resumed using the Cadillac V-
8 in 1937, but it would be the last hurrah.  It limped along until 1940, when it was 
quietly dropped, along with the unprofitable Cadillac V-16 line. 
Curiously, the LaSalle’s last three seasons showed considerable gains in sale , 
even as its star in the G.M. firmament set.   As the Great Depression crept toward i s 
end, LaSalle posted sales of 14,675 in 1938, 21,127 in 1939, and 24,130 in 1940.  It is 
possible, therefore, to conclude that G.M. snuffed out the LaSalle’s candle just as it 
was once again finding its market.  That is not, however, the consensus of most 
automotive historians who point to the fact that the car that replaced the LaSalle, the 








The “Turret Top” and longer, lower, all steel bodies 
During these years, a production innovation occurred that would play a role in 
both establishing Cadillac as the dominant player in its market, both by making it 
(and the rest of the G.M. line) among the most modern cars on the market and by 
helping to eliminate some of its competition.  It began with U. S. Steel’s introducti n 
of strip steel in 88-inch widths.  This made possible the one piece “Turret Top” which 
made its bow on G.M.’s 1935 models.  Prior to this time, all cars had a wood-framed, 
fabric-covered panel in the center of the roof.  Compared with an all-steel roof, this 
was noisier, required special upkeep, and was prone to leak as it aged.  The Turret 
Top made all G.M. cars look more modern.  It also made it possible for a car to be 
built with an all-steel body, rather than using a composite of steel with wood framing, 
as had been done since the genesis of the industry.69 
Manufacturing the Turret Top required the installation of the largest steel 
presses heretofore used in the industry.  The all-steel body entailed far greate tooling 
costs than the composite method of construction, wood being inherently more 
malleable than steel.  Sally Clarke quotes Gordon Buehrig – chief designer of th  
revolutionary Cord 810 and later an important designer at Ford – as saying that 
tooling costs for wood to framing as ranging from $30,000 to $50,000 and that 
tooling for all-steel bodies could range from $10 to $20 million.70 Since the annual 
model change had become an established part of life in the industry by the mid-
1930s, at least some of this tooling had to be replaced every year.  Since G.M. could 
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amortize these costs over a far larger production run than could its smaller 
competitors, Cadillac gained an important competitive advantage.  As will be seen 
below, these costs were extremely detrimental to Packard’s ability to compete in the 
mid-1950s. 
By the late 1930s, styling had solidly established itself as a key factor in the 
marketing of all General Motors products.  Sloan himself wrote in 1941 that, “the 
appearance of a motorcar is a most important factor in the selling end of the business 
– perhaps the most important single factor because everybody knows that all cars wil 
run.”71  That same year, Harley Earl quipped that “I have watched them spend 




The Sixty Special and a new direction in styling 
As LaSalle entered its five year death throes after 1935, design leadership 
returned to the Cadillac line.  Perhaps the best example of this trend was the 
groundbreaking 1938 Cadillac Sixty Special.  The Sixty Special was a watershed 
vehicle for a number of reasons.  Perhaps most importantly, it was a harbinger of 
styling trends for the next decade.  The entire car was approximately three inches 
lower than anything else that Cadillac built, but this was not a case of achieving the 
look of a lower car by simply lowering the top and sacrificing interior headroom.  In 
this case, the entire car was lowered by using a “double drop” frame in which the 
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outer rails of the frame were decreased in height and then supplemented by an X-
member between the frame rails.  The result was a shallower frame that was 
substantially stiffer than the taller frame that it replaced.73  The lowering of the car 
also dropped its center of gravity, resulting in a better handling and more controllable 
automobile.    
 
 
1939 Newspaper advertisement.   
(Source Antique Automobile Club of America Library) 
 
As can be seen by the above advertisement featuring both the Sixty Special 
and the LaSalle, it is easy to see that the shorter Sixty Special, despite its reduction in 
height, was a more substantial looking car than the “older” LaSalle.  The combination 
of lower height and greater length (126 in. wheelbase vs. 120 in.) produced a greater 
sense of width as well.  Lowering the car meant that its designer could dispense with 
the traditional running boards, which made ingress and egress more graceful. 
To modern eyes, the differences may not appear as great as they did in 1939, 
and Cadillac played up those differences in their advertising.  The 1939 catalog 
                                                




proclaimed that “When the first Sixty Specials rolled down America’s highways, 
startled motorists rubbed their eyes and looked – again and again.   For here, indeed, 
was something different – a car so low that it seemed to spring right out of the 
pavement . . . a closed car with doors so wide and pillars so narrow that it looked like 
a cabriolet . . . a car whose seats were so wide that every passenger could ride in 
complete comfort.”  
Another reason that the Sixty Special was significant was that it was the first 
signature design by the man who would one day replace Harley Earl as head of G.M. 
Styling, William Mitchell.   Mitchell was only 23 when he joined G.M. Art and 
Colour in 1935.  Mitchell clearly gained Earl’s confidence early on and according to 
one source was the head of Cadillac styling from the fall of 1936.74  G. M. Styling 
was administratively a work in progress throughout the 1930s and the separate brands 
did not possess separate studio groups until about 1938.  Eventually these groups 
would become extremely segregated; to the extent that only Earl himself had the keys 
that would get him entrance to all of the studios, but that was still to come when 
Mitchell joined the staff.  Another designer, Strother McMinn would describe the 
G.M. studio in the mid-1930s as “a wild mix of seasoned professionals, mad 
illustrators, art moderne architects, highly skilled pattern makers, subtly sensitive 
sculptors and car-crazy kids.”75   
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1938 Cadillac Sixty Special 
Source: New York Public Library Digital Collection, Image #1570530 
 
However, it must be pointed out that this design, however advanced it may 
have been compared with other cars, was still derivative.   According to Nick 
Georgano, Cadillac division manager Nicholas Dreystadt had been impressed by the 
Cord 810 of 1936-37.  That car had been much admired throughout the industry, and 
remains a hallmark among collectors today.  Unfortunately, the Cord organizatio , 
which also included Auburn and Duesenburg, was in its death throws when the car 
came out, and was never able to take full advantage of the 810’s styling.  The 
situation was a near copy of that in which Earl had designed the 1927 LaSalle – 
borrowing styling cues from a little seen design that had already gained f vor 
amongst the elite.  In a 1985 interview Mitchell disclaimed credit for the design 
because he had done it under Earl’s supervision76, a d certainly the design is in 
accord with Earl’s overall design philosophy, but there is also a sense of decorative 
restraint that is more typical of the work that Mitchell oversaw in the 1960s than that 
of Earl’s over the top approach to decoration that would be seen in the 1950s. 
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Hydra-matic and the coming of war 
For the most part, the introduction of Sixty Special combined with the 
dropping of the LaSalle and V-16 lines would be the last of Cadillac’s big news until 
World War II put a temporary end to all civilian automotive production.  There is one 
exception to this statement.  That was the introduction of Hydra-Matic, a fully 
automatic transmission, to the Cadillac line in 1941.  Engineered by the Oldsmobile 
division and first used on its 1940 line, Hydra-Matic gave Cadillac a highly desirable 
feature that would not soon be seen on any competitive car.  Packard would offer its 
own Ultramatic late in the 1949 model year, and Lincoln would be forced to buy 
G.M.’s Hydra-Matics from 1950 until Ford engineers introduced their own automatic 






Chapter 3: From Luxury Car to Cultural Icon 
During the fifteen years following the end of World War II, Cadillac not only 
became the dominant player in the U.S. luxury car market, the brand itself became a 
synonym for all things luxurious.  During that period, it was not unusual to hear a 
product referred to as the “Cadillac of” its type.  Even today (2009) at a time when 
the Cadillac brand is significantly diminished, a Google search asking for “Cadillac 
of” still revealed mentions of the P-51 as the Cadillac of the Skies, the HP Mini as the
Cadillac of Netbooks, the International Baccalaureate as the Cadillac of College-Prep 
Programs, the Trade Adjustment Act as setting up the Cadillac of all unemployment 
benefits, and specific products as the Cadillac of Picnic Sets, the Cadillac of Golf
Carts, and the Cadillac of Walkers.  The 1960 Broadway Musical Bye, Bye Birdie 
included a popular song in which its teenage rock ‘n’ roll star hero sang: 
There are chicks just ripe for some kissin' 
And I mean to kiss me a few! 
Then those chicks don't know what they're missin', 
I got a lot of living to do! 
Sizzlin' steaks all ready for tastin' 
And there's Cadillacs all shiny and new! 
Gotta move, cause time is a-wastin', 




In light of the much-photographed enthusiasm over the end of World War II 
and the rose-tinted nostalgia that has often distorted our view of the era, it is easy to
                                                




believe that its product-driven economic euphoria was inevitable.  In economic ter s,
the popular explanation is simple – pent-up demand caused by the economic 
deprivation of the Great Depression and the unavailability of goods during World 
War II combined with historically high rates of employment during the war produced 
a condition in which masses of consumers both wanted goods and had the money to 
pay for them.  This unprecedented demanded for all forms of consumer goods created 
the jobs that employed the G.I.’s who were returning home, and led the way to 
massive prosperity lasting until the recession of 1958. 
However, it is important to remember that the rosy scenario of the prosperous 
1950s was hardly seen as inevitable by those who were living through it.  Those with 
memories that stretched back a couple of decades remembered the brief but severe 
depression of 1920-21 that was in part the result of the return of unemployed veterans 
of World War I.78  This was a major impetus behind the passage of the far-reaching 
‘G. I. Bill of Rights.’ Prominent business figures in other industries also held a bleak 
view of postwar prospects.  Richard Tedlow points out that Sewell Avery’s decision 
to retrench played a major role in Montgomery Ward’s loss of its traditional role as a 
leader in the field of retailing, as a more optimistic Sears surged ahead.79  General 
Motors itself saw the necessity to reassure the public with an advertisement in the 
New York Times on September 2, 1944 in which a large banner waved denoting the 
100,637 G. M. employees who were at war, followed by the caption, “We salute G. 
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M.’s “G. I.’s” – We are waiting to bring them back – We are planning jobs for 
them.”80   
A review of the issues of Motor, a periodical designed for the Automotive 
retailer, for the first five years following the end of the war reveals an impressive 
number of concerns. Among these were increased competition among dealers, 
inflation, materials shortages (especially steel), a slacking of demand once the 
temporary demand for new cars caused by the war was met, the developing black 
market in cars, unscrupulous dealer practices, and the possible resumption of the 
automakers forcing unwanted cars on dealers as had happened during the 
Depression.81  
However uncertain the future may have been, it is safe to say that the return to 
civilian production was eagerly anticipated by virtually everyone. 









Advertising the unobtainable 
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Cadillac advertising, which during the War had been largely limited to 
wartime scenes featuring one of the division’s wartime products in a combat scene, 
the only copy being a bold-face “Cadillac” began to reflect the popular anticipation.  
Without a product to display, Cadillac advertising featured the customers who were 
looking forward to purchasing their post-war Cadillacs.  Of course, the images of 











1945 Cadillac Ads, Source – General Motors Heritage Center 
 
 
This behavior was not unusual.  Buick showed a 1942 model convertible and 
asserted that it would be so nice to come home to.  At the same time, Ford began its 
famous “There’s a Ford in Your Future” campaign which would provide its 
advertising theme for several years after the War ended.  It was also a logical 
extension to the MacManus and Adams advertising philosophy discussed earlier, that 
of selling the trademark rather than the product.  By this time Adams was in sole







Huge demand and massive inflation 
Like everywhere else in the industry, when the first post-war civilian vehicle 
rolled off the line at Cadillac’s now-venerable Clark Avenue plant on October 17, 
1945, it was little changed from its 1942 counterpart.    
Prices, on the other hand were up sharply.  The Consumer Price Index (see 
Appendix G), which had gradually increased from 20.3 and 21.4 between 1935 and 
1940 before jumping to 23.0 in 1941, soared to 34.1 in 1947.  By 1949, it would stand 
at 40.9.  
Cadillac’s price leading Model 61 Club Coupe had sold for $1,450 in 1942.  
By 1946, the price had ballooned to $2,052.  In fact, the top-of-the-line Pontiac cost 
more than the pre-war Cadillac had.  In any event, Cadillac appears to have 
deliberately built few of its least expensive models, all the better to milk maximum 
profits out of the sellers’ market.  Only 800 of the Series 61 Coupes were sold 
compared with 2,323 of the Series 62 Coupes which retailed at $2,284.  In four-door 
sedans the production gulf was even wider – 2,200 Series 61’s as opposed to 14,900 
of the more expensive Series 62’s.  Almost two and a half times as many of 
glamorous Sixty Specials ($3,095) were turned out than the price leading 61’s. 
Counterbalancing the sharp increases in prices was an increase in income.  
The national income, as low as $41.6 billion in the depth of the depression, stood at 
$105.9 billion at the outbreak of the war.  Each succeeding year (except 1945) 
showed a marked increase, and by 1947, the national income was $202.9 billion, 




Of course, with the overwhelming demand for new cars at war’s end, the 
system for distributing them was likely to be contentious.  Here, Cadillac’s policy 
was a sub-set of G. M. corporate policy.  Devised in March of 1942, the “Sloan 
System” would be in effect from October 1945 to October 1947.  It allocated cars to 
dealers based on their 1941 performance.82  How successful this policy was and how 
closely it was adhered to remains a matter of conjecture.  It certainly ended long 
before the shortage in cars did.  Sloan himself asserted that the shortage of Cadillacs 
lasted into nineteen-fifty-seven.83  
All of the established manufacturers sold cars “warmed-over” designs in 
1946.  Even in this, however, Cadillac enjoyed an advantage over its competitors.  
Cadillac had heavily facelifted its offerings for the short 1942 model year.  This 




A dwindling Packard, a forgettable Lincoln, and an uncertain Imperial 
The first season after the War would be the last time that Packard would out 
sell Cadillac – 30,883 units vs. 29,194.  However, merely looking at the total 
production figures here is misleading.  Well over two-thirds of Packard production 
was in its Clipper Six, Clipper Eight, and Clipper Deluxe Eight lines.  The pric  
spread among these lines was from $1,680 to $1,817 – well below the lowest Cadillac 
                                                





price of $2,052.  These were cars that competed with Buick and Oldsmobile.  Only 
7,687 of the units that Packard produced competed directly with Cadillac.  
As seen above, Packard had enjoyed considerable success with a careful move 
down-market in the 1920s.  In 1932, they attempted a similar move with the 
introduction of its “Light Eight” model, which was not a success owing largely to the 
cost of its manufacture relative to its price, as well as the overall depressed condition 
of the 1932 economy.  Packard’s most significant and deepest move down-market 
had begun in January 1935, with the introduction of its 120 model.  Using vastly 
more modern manufacturing techniques than any previous Packard, it was also much 
less expensive than any car they had ever produced, with prices that began at $980.  It 
still carried the Packard name and Packard styling cues, the car was a great success 
and, according to numerous automotive historians, saved the company.84  
However successful in the short term, that move robbed Packard of much of 
the luster necessary to call your product a luxury car and demand that prices that 
came along with that status.  Low priced Packards closely resembled their hig  
priced stablemates, differing chiefly in wheelbase length and interior appointments.  
Every $1500 Packard sold adversely affected Packard’s ability to sell a $4000 car to a 
status conscious buyer.   This was a problem that Cadillac did not share.  One of the 
advantages of G. M.’s highly stratified divisional structure was that everybody knew 
the difference between a Cadillac, a Buick, and an Oldsmobile. 
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These were only the most obvious of Packard’s problems.  The first full year 
after the War would bring steel shortages, labor stoppages, and production issues – 
chiefly concerning body production, which Packard had largely farmed out to the 
Briggs Manufacturing Company.  The upshot was that during the time when Packard 
and any other manufacturer could sell everything that it could pump out, Packard 
production was often uncertain.  Some of these problems would remain unsolved for 
years.85 
All that being said, however, the biggest single reason that Packard out-
produced Cadillac in 1946 was probably a 113 day strike against General Motors that 
started on November 21, 1945.86  It is a safe assumption that Cadillac would have 
built far more than the 1,689 units that separated the two manufacturers had its lines 
been running for those four months. 
Cadillac’s other major competitors were Ford’s Lincoln line and the Chrysler 
Imperial.  Both had serious problems of their own.   
In 1946, Ford was only beginning to emerge from years of administrative 
anarchy.  Company founder Henry Ford was feeble and would die the following year.  
Henry’s son and presumed heir, Edsel had died during the war.  Grandson Henry Ford 
II had been discharged from the Navy specifically to prevent the company from 
falling into complete bedlam and had only been given authority by his grandfather 
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when old Henry’s wife and daughter-in-law threatened to sell their stock in the 
Company.87 
With an entire company to save, Henry Ford II had little time to focus 
specifically on Lincoln.  Like the Cadillac and Packard, the 1946 Lincoln was 
basically a warmed-over 1942, a situation that would continue until the 1949 model 
year.  In 1946, Lincoln sold a little more than half of the cars Cadillac did, with a total 
of 16,645 in prices ranging from $2,318 to $4,474. 
One of the biggest problems that the Chrysler Imperial had was summed up in 
its name.  Unlike Cadillac and Lincoln, the most prestigious Chrysler product had no 
specific product identification of its own.  It was simply the highest trim level in the 
Chrysler line-up.  This situation would continue until the Imperial was raised to 
independent brand-name status in 1955.  Additionally, the Chrysler Imperial 
nameplate had been taken deeply down-market as early as 1933 when the Imperial 
Eight Coupe carried a $1,275 price tag.   The cheapest Cadillac was still twice as 
expensive.  Moreover, in 1946 the Chrysler Imperial was available in only one model, 
a limousine at $3,875.  In 1947, a slightly less expensive sedan model would be 
added, but it would be late in 1949 before the Chrysler Imperial would expand 
beyond that limited offering and 1951 before a coupe and convertible would be added 
to the line.  Production figures for individual models and years within the Chrysler 
line are apparently unavailable, but the Imperial Club (an enthusiasts’ online group) 
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Fins and high compression 
Given the competitive situation just described, one can posit that Cadillac was 
the most important player in the luxury car market, but not yet the dominant player 
that it would be by the end of the 1950s.  In the next few years, Cadillac would 
acquire two elements, one stylistic and one technological, that would help to create 
that dominance – the coming of the fin in 1948 and the high-compression V-8 in 
1949. 
Obviously, the fin came out of Harley Earl’s Styling department.  By this time 
Earl had long since consolidated his hold on the department.  G. M. designer Homer 
LaGassey summed up the imposing role that Earl played. 
[T]he guy did all of the design, all the product planning, all the 
projects with the president of the company, himself, and his general 
managers of each one of those divisions.  There were not 50 guys that 
could come in and lean on you from product planning, at that moment 
in time, today there are echelons on echelons of people. There were no 
survey people, per se.  He did that whole damned thing himself, which 
now takes a multitude of people to do.89 
 
Long-time Detroit legend holds that the tail-fin was inspired by the twin tails 
of the World War II-era Lockheed P-38 Lightning.  If the tale is true, there was some 
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severe turbulence as it prepared to land on Cadillac.  Its development offers an insight 
into the way in which that system functioned in the late 1940s.  Franklin Hershey, 
who would later play a major role in designing the first Ford Thunderbird, claimed 
credit for the innovation.  As he told the story: 
So, I had the Cadillac studio, … I put the fin on the Cadillac,… we did 
this—we did this in ’46 before, it takes about two years to get all that 
done or more.  Put the fin on it. …  Harley Earl came screaming up to 
where we were working on the ’48.  “Take the goddamned fin off!  
Nobody likes it.  Dealers don’t like it the public don’t, nobody likes 
it.” … So I just covered it up with a piece of canvas.  I couldn’t take it 
off.  …  Harley came by one day, and he said, “Take that fin off.”  
“Yep!,”  that’s all I said.  So finally he came up with—…  I think it 
was Jack Gordon [Cadillac Division General Manager, 1946-1950].  
I’m not sure.  ...  Anyhow, he [Earl] said, “Did you take that fin off 
back there?”  I said, “No.”  He said, “Oh, thank God.”  So he pulled 
the canvas off, and he said, “Oh boy.  We found everybody loves it.”90 
It was a controversial move.  As William Mitchell said in 1955, “It takes a 
controversial design to be a success.  If it’s ‘nice’ we don’t like it.  We like something 
gutty, something shocking.”   About half of the feedback that G. M. management got 
from the auto shows about the fins was negative – at first.  However, within a few 
weeks the fin appeared to have grown on people and it achieved a high degree of 
public acceptance.91  Instantly, the Cadillac became the most recognizable vehicle in 
the world when viewed from the rear.  Before that, the rear of a car was a fairly 
generic affair, a simple curve tapering down from the bottom of the roof to the rear 
bumper with the car’s nameplate and some adornment around the trunk lid handle.   
One measure of the fin’s popularity was the extent to which practitioners of the new 
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“Hot Rod” craze borrowed the fins for their creations.  Before long a kit was available 







The real thing and the pretender.  The 1948 Sixty Special and the “Cad-Fin” that was 
available for Fords, Chevys and Pontiacs from Auto Accessories Co. for $29.95. 
Sources: : http://images.businessweek.com/ss/06/03/cadillac/source/10.htm and 
Motor Trend, March 1951, p.7 
 
 
If the tail fin was “all show and no go”, the high compression V-8 that 
Cadillac introduced in 1949 was very much the opposite.  Compression is the second 
of the four strokes that typify the vast majority of car engines since the inception of 
the automobile.  Basically, the more compressed the air/fuel mixture becomes, the 
more powerful the explosion that is the combustion stroke will be.  More powerful 
combustion makes an engine more powerful and more economic.  However, it needs 
higher quality fuel.  The new engine was 220 pounds lighter and had a smaller 
displacement than its predecessor, yet the car was significantly faster.  Tom McCahill 
of Mechanix Illustrated, one of the first of a new breed of automotive journalists that 
had sprung up since the end of World War II was sufficiently enthusiastic about the 
new engine that he said, “It’s unquestionably America’s finest automobile to date. 




American car now being made.”92  Other automotive journalists agreed, and the 1949 
Cadillac became the first Motor Trend Car of the Year. 
 
Illustration from Motor Trend, November 1949, comparing the size of the 1948 and 
1949 Cadillac engines 
Source: Antique Automobile Club of America Library 
 
 
Nor was its praise limited to U. S. journalists.  The venerable British Journal 
The Motor tested the largely unchanged 1950 model in its March 22, 1950 issue and 
came to the conclusion that, “the car offers astonishing value for money.  It has 
performance which few makes can rival, even fewer surpass, a general silence of 
running (including low wind noise) which many will consider unbeaten, and an ease 




Selling a sense of success 
As the 1950s dawned, Cadillac’s special place in the marketplace was 
beginning to make itself felt.  Changing Times, a non-enthusiast magazine intended to 
help people manage their money reported that, “Ninety-nine out of a hundred 
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Americans have never driven a Cadillac or even taken a ride in one.  But, according 
to surveys, an overwhelming percentage of them say they would rather have a 
Cadillac than any other car in the world if they could afford one.” 93  Apparently, an 
increasing number of Americans were finding it possible to do just that, during the 
new engine’s freshman year 92,554 were produced, and 1950 saw Cadillac break 
100,000 for the first time, with a model year production of 103,857. 
It was James Adams’s job to make sure that this trend continued.  He did it by 
stressing a combination of snob appeal and availability.  This seeming contradiction 
is seen in the newspaper ad in which the reader is reminded that, despite Cadillac’s 
quality, it was surprisingly affordable. 
 
1949 Cadillac Newspaper ad 
Source: Antique Automobile Club of America Library 
 
The heart of the argument is that eight manufacturers sold cars that cost more 
than the least expensive Cadillac, and that buyers of these cars could have enjoyed the 
quality of Cadillac and saved money as well. 
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In 1955, William H. Whyte writing for Fortune Magazine narrated the 
following tale by borrowing from the copy of Adams’s ads for Cadillac: 
Let's say it was thirty-one years ago, on a beautiful morning in 
June. A boy stood by a rack of papers on a busy street and heard the 
friendly horn of a Cadillac. "Keep the change," the driver smiled, as he 
took his paper and rolled out into the traffic. "There," thought the boy, 
as he clutched his coin, "is the car for me!" 
And since this is America, where dreams make sense in the heart 
of a boy, he is now an industrialist. He has fought — without 
interruption —for the place in the world he wants his family to occupy. 
Few would deny him some taste of the fruits of labor. No compromise 
this time! The papers are all in order...and the car of his dreams is 
waiting for him. It's his! 
It's Junetime—and the top is down—and he's going halfway up the 
hill, to a spot where a lane strays into the wild-wood and he can 
glimpse the top of a fieldstone chimney above the trees. The family 
rushes out with the final voice of confirmation. "Hi there, neighbor, 
isn't it a lovely day?" 
There's the first trip to the office with a waiting delegation to 
admire his choice. He'll get those quick glances of approval that tell 
him the dream he dreamed for so marry years is still in the hearts of 
others. 
Let him arrive at the door of a distinguished hotel or a famous 
restaurant ... and he has the courtesy that goes with respect. "Here is a 
man," the Cadillac says — almost as plainly as the words are written, 
here — "who has earned the right to sit at this wheel."
94
 
   
A new Cadillac was not just a car.  In James Adams’s world it was an 
aspiration, a sign of favor from the powers that be, a way of life.  His task was to 
make it a way of as many peoples’ lives as possible. 
Adams was profiled by James Nagle for the New York Times in 1953.  As if 
to confirm Roland Marchand’s point about advertising professionals being in the 
upper middle class, and therefore understanding that buyer best, Nagle pointed out 
that, “At fifty five, Jim has the appearance of a man who should be the owner of a 
                                                





Cadillac.  He looks prosperous, tall, and well upholstered.  Asked his weight, he 
chuckled, ‘no comment.’”95 
A new tone of lavishness was seen in Cadillac’s magazine advertising as well.  
Adams began a theme in 1949 that would last over a decade, that of using jewels to 
emphasize Cadillac’s position as a status symbol.  The jewels were always chosen to 
accent the color of the car being shown, and there was always a tag line indentifying 
the jeweler.   To the casual onlooker, the implied message was simple, that Cadillac 
was the car of choice for those who could afford such baubles.   Only to the reader 
serious enough to read the rather small copy at the bottom would the secret that the 
Cadillac was surprisingly affordable, easy to drive, or economical in operation be 
opened.  To that reader, the message is more complex; that it might well be possile 
for him or her to join those whose automobiles could stand out amid such luxury.  










Bejeweled 1949 Cadillac Advertising 
Source: General Motors Heritage Center 
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Perhaps the significant item in these ads is the placement of the Cadillac 
trademark, which was actually devised from the genuine heraldic device used by 
Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac.  Pamela Walker Laird relates the process through 
which trademarks developed as advertising substitutes for pictures of the founders of 
the firm in question, depictions of its factories, and sometimes florid company names 
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.96  
Some early Cadillac advertising used what the division, even today, calls “the 
crest”, but it appears that at least as often it did not.  Throughout the 1920s and most 
of the 1930s, the crest was frequently, but by no means universally used in Cadillac 
ads, and when it was used it was not prominent.  Usage of the crest appears to have 
increased as World War II drew near.  Of course, as we have already seen, the crest 
substituted for an as-yet-unbuilt product late in World War II.  In these 1949 ads, the 
crest, combined with the Cadillac script, had taken on a totem-like character – as 
though they were objects of reverence.  It was far more important than the picturs of 
the cars, the copy, and the jewels that serve to embellish it. 
The crest took on a similar function on the cars themselves.  Until the mid-
1930s, use of the crest was usually limited to a relatively small circle at the top of the 
radiator shell, the middle of the horn button, and occasionally a small crest would 
appear on the dashboard.  However, by the late 1930s, Harley Earl had begun to 
realize the role that a well used trademark could be used as an element in his attempt 
to make three relatively similar, although differently sized, inner bodies into five 
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separate and distinct brands of automobile.  From that point, the crests (similar, 
wholly fictitious devices were invented for Buick and Oldsmobile, Pontiacs featured 
the supposed head of Chief Pontiac, and Chevrolet used its famous “bow tie” 
emblem) increased in size, sprouted embellishments, and were featured more 








On each model throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Cadillac Crest was always 
prominently displayed – albeit with a variety of forms and embellishments, always on 
the hood and deck lid, and often on the sides as well.  Most years, the Cadillac name 
was also prominently placed. 
Source: Author’s collection 
 
 
On November 25, 1949, a 1950 Cadillac Coupe de Ville became the one 
millionth Cadillac to be produced.  Automotive News, an industry trade publication, 
ran the obligatory photo of the car coming off the line by the Cadillac General 
Manager, the Sales Manager, and the Plant Manager, all broadly grinning.  They had 
a lot to grin about.  It had taken Cadillac forty-seven years to build its first m llion, 
but at the anticipated rate of 100,000 per year, General Manager John Gordon stated 




retirement age in 1965.97  (That goal would be easily exceeded and Gordon’s own 
advancement would continue until he would retire as the President of the 
Corporation.) 
To modern eyes, the second part of the headline the Automotive News tory 
about the millionth Cadillac is somewhat surprising given Cadillac’s well-known 
penchant for building the largest of autos, “No Small Car in ’50.”  Most major 
manufacturers, including all of the big three, were considering the construction of 
smaller cars in the early 1950s. Nash, Hudson, Willys, Kaiser-Frazier, and Crosley 
would actually build and market one.  For all but Nash, it would prove to be their 
undoing.  Three facts proved the folly of such an undertaking.  First, it was simply not 
possible to build a small car to sell for much less than Ford, Chevrolet, and Plymouth 
were building their “full size” cars.  Second, the robust used car market was capable 
of providing cars for those who could not afford the new car of their choice.  Third, 
most Americans still equated size with luxury.  There would be no “small” Cadillac 
until the 1976 model year. 
This is not to say that Cadillac was averse to a careful trip down-market, 
provided that the luster of the marque was not tarnished.  As pointed out above, a 
recurring advertising theme was its “surprising” affordability.  In the press release 
that heralded the millionth Cadillac, General Manager Gordon was quoted as saying,
“Fifteen years ago the average price of a Cadillac automobile was more than four and 
one-half times that of the average price of cars sold in the industry.  Since then this 
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ratio has been greatly reduced until, at the present time, the average Cadillac price is 
only 1.6 times the average price of cars sold in the automotive field.”98 
  
Section 7 
Selling the sizzle - Motorama 
It was also in 1949 that General Motors first used a marketing device that they 
would later call Motorama.99  The idea was not new; General Motors had long seen 
the value of getting people excited about technology.  In earlier years, General 
Motors had sponsored its own display in a hotel ballroom, usually at the Astor House 
or the Waldorf-Astoria in conjunction with the National Auto Show in New York 
City.  The G. M. pavilion at the 1939 New York Worlds’ Fair featured a huge display 
showing the roads and cars of 1960 called Futurama.  Additionally, the corporation 
had also sponsored travelling shows featuring scientific and technological 
breakthroughs that could be seen in high school auditoriums and at county fairs for 
years. 
Motorama took this concept to its natural extent.  It was a show to which the 
public was invited without cost.  Of course, the various automobiles produced by G. 
M. held center stage, but there was a wide variety of displays from other G. M. 
divisions (Frigidaire, Hyatt Roller Bearing, AC Spark Plugs, etc.). 
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To say that Motorama was elaborate would be a severe understatement.  The 
New York Times related the cost of the 1949 show at the Waldorf-Astoria to have 
been $500,000.  Dubbed “Transportation Unlimited”, this 1949 show featured 31 
cars, a “Train of Tomorrow” and a cut-away jet engine.  Fisher Body contributed an 
large display detailing the construction of car bodies and interiors.  The secrets of 
Hydra-Matic were on display for those who could understand them.  Herbert Hoover, 
Dwight Eisenhower, and the exiled King of Yugoslavia visited.  Four specially 
trimmed-out Cadillacs were on display, including a special town car intended for Mrs. 
Sloan.  A customized convertible conveyed the message that true rugged manhood 
and a love of luxury were not mutually exclusive.  Dubbed “El Rancho,” it featured 
saddle leather upholstery, suede trim, carpets of cow hide with the hair left on it, and 
built-in pistol holsters.  Reportedly, it was destined for John Gordon’s Arizona ranch.  
During the first hour 5,300 visitors came in and attendance for the first day was 
roughly 55,000.  It ran for seven January days in New York, and was reconstructed 
for a six-day run in Detroit.100 
The name Motorama was applied to this concept the following year.  Similar 
in size and scope to the 1949 show, 1950’s “Mid-century Motorama” focused on the 
history of the automobile and especially on G. M.’s role in it.  Thirty-eight cars we e 
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displayed this time and the Duke and Duchess of Windsor dropped by to purchase a 






The 1950 Motorama would be the last until 1953, when two basic changes 
were made.  First, the 1953-1956 Motoramas would visit 5-6 cities (New York, 
Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and either Dallas, Chicago, or Boston).  Second, 
G. M. would make prominent display of what were then called dream cars.  Earlier 
shows had featured customized versions of factory vehicles along side of those that 
could actually be purchased by the normal consumer.  These dream cars, or concept 
cars to use the more modern term, were something else entirely.  These were 
individually built cars, displayed to gauge public reaction to some idea that was then 
under consideration.   
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Like the Motorama itself, these dream cars had their genesis in the early 
1930s.  In 1938, Harley Earl had a heavily modified Buick built to test styling ideas 
and serve as his personal transportation.  The result was the “Y Job”. 
 
1938 Y Job 
Source: http://wallpapers.bpix.org/wp_17__Buick_Y-Job_Concept_Car,_1938.html  
 
The Y Job was an exciting car to look at, especially when compared with 
other cars of the time.  Measuring only 58 inches tall, it was 74 inches wide, its 
overall proportions were much lower and wider than other cars of its time.102  Its 
design influence in the late 1940’s is obvious, especially when it is compared with 
Cadillac or Buick coupes of the period.  
By the late 1940’s the mine of ideas that the Y Job represented was largely 
played out.  Under the direction of Harley Earl and Chief Engineer Charles Chayne, 
two new dream cars were made, the Le Sabre and the XP-300.  Both were full of 
innovation, fully functional, and very expensive.103  Each would be prominently 
displayed at the 1953 Motorama.  The styling studios of the divisions were expected 
to make contributions as well, in Cadillac’s case they were the LeMans, basically a 
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stock Cadillac convertible with the center section removed to make a two seat 
vehicle, and the Orleans, which borrowed the then-popular pillarless hardtop coupe 
style and made it into a four-door vehicle.  These vehicles were more than the term 
dream cars implied.  Reportedly, some thought was given to producing the LeMans, 
and four were actually made.  Cadillac would use the Orleans concept and add a four-
door hardtop to its line in 1956. 
In addition to the cost of the cars displayed, the 1953 Motorama cost G.M. 
over five million dollars, for displays, Broadway-style musical acts, stagecr ft, 
personnel, and transportation.  Corporate management must have considered it a 
success, because similar shows took place in 1954, 1955, and 1956. 
 
Section 8 
Cadillac as a metaphor for Eisenhower’s America 
In Dwight David Eisenhower, America found a leader who both calmed its 
fears and confirmed its aspirations.  Having received popular acclaim for defeating 
Hitler, he seemed the ideal man to stare down Josef Stalin.  Yet at the same time h  
projected the comforting image of a small-town boy made good – very good indeed.  
That combination of power, comfort, and prestige had great appeal in the 1950’s.  It 
was also a more than adequate description of Cadillac’s appeal to the same 
Americans who so liked Ike. 
The inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower as President of the United States  in 
1953 saw a new high in both G.M.’s and Cadillac’s visibility and influence.  Like 




side of the event was seen in the two official presidential processions to and from the 
inauguration.  When President-elect Eisenhower arrived at the White House, he and 
President Truman got into the official White House parade car, a 1949 Lincoln 
Cosmopolitan.  After officially taking office, President Eisenhower rode to the parade 












The actual implications to the transfer of power lay in two appointments that 
placed men closely connected to General Motors into the new cabinet.  Arthur E. 
Summerfield, a very successful Chevrolet dealer in Flint, Michigan who served as 
Chairman of the Republican National Committee, became Postmaster-General.104  Of 
greater importance was the fact that G. M. President Charles E. Wilson became 
Secretary of Defense.  At a time when such proceedings attracted far less ttention 
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The Transfer of Power:  On their way to the 1953 inauguration, Truman and Eisenhower 
rode in the official White House parade car, a 1949 Lincoln Cosmopolitan.  After the 
ceremony, Eisenhower switched to a 1953 Cadillac Eldorado. 
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than they do today, Wilson catapulted into national headlines during his confirmation 
hearings before the Senate.  Wilson was asked if he could make a decision that was 
adverse to the interests of General Motors.  Since G.M. was a major defense 
contractor, the question was highly pertinent.  Wilson’s rather cavalier reply was that 
he could not conceive of such a situation because, “for years I thought what was good 
for the country was good for General Motors and vice versa.”  In light of the fact that 
Wilson owned G. M. stock valued at $2.5 million, a minor scandal erupted, and 
Wilson was forced to divest himself of the stock.105 
Even if many were upset by Wilson’s comment, to others it was eminently 
correct and provable.  Certainly, General Motors had come to see itself as the epitome 
of American free enterprise and maybe of America itself.  (See Appendix B.) 
Charles Wilson’s travails may have led to yet another sign of Cadillac’s 
developing cultural significance, the Broadway premiere of The Solid Gold Cadillac 
by Howard Teichmann and George S. Kaufman on November 5, 1953.  In it, a minor 
and troublesome female stockholder in the fictional General Products Corporation 
was able to play a role in persuading the corporation’s former President and 
Chairman of the Board, who has taken an important position in government, to return 
and remove the corrupt and lazy men who have taken over the Corporation in his 
absence.106   A successful 1956 film followed the closing of the show on Broadway. 
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Washington Post and Times Herald advertisement – October 10, 1956, page 58. 
(Notice the last line advertising a contest to win a share of G. M. stock.) 
 
This is the kind of advertising that money cannot buy, and while it is 
impossible to quantify, has to have played a role in establishing the Cadillac as 
something more than a product. 
Indeed, it is possible to see the years of The Solid Gold Cadillac’s run, 1953-
1956, as the golden age of the Alfred Sloan-Harley Earl era Cadillac. By this time G. 
M. was at the top of its game, selling about half of all cars in the United States, so 
many that there were voices saying that the corporation should be split up, and anti-
trust action was going on that would eventually split G. M. away from DuPont, the 
corporation whose millions had kept G. M. from bankruptcy in 1920.  Sloan turned 
80 in 1955, and rumors of his retirement had been circulating since the end of World 




He gave up the Chairmanship in 1956.  Earl would turn 65 in 1958, when G. M. law 
said he must retire.  But in 1953-1956, Sloan was still in charge – although Harlow 
Curtice was calling the shots on a day-to-day basis –and Earl was still the only power 
at G. M. Design. 
Through all of this period, Cadillac grew slightly longer, slightly lower, and 
slightly more powerful each year.  And, for all intents and purposes, incremental 
improvements were about all that was possible.  Having added power steering and 
brakes in the early 1950s, air conditioning was being refined and slowly gaining 
acceptance during the middle of the decade.  Motor Trend, which was itself becoming 
the pre-eminent car enthusiast’s magazine, said of the 1954 Cadillac, “These cars may 
have the outline of a landing barge, but it’s the one the admiral rides in.”107  A few 
months later, the same magazine named the Cadillac Model 62 “The Hottest-
Performing Car.”108 
While Cadillac was subtly refining what had clearly become a winning 
combination of style, engineering, and marketing, its competitors were in a process of 
redefinition.   
 
Section 9 
Requiescat in Pace, Packard Motor Car Company (1899-1958) 
Worst off was the sole independent manufacturer in the luxury car field, 
Packard.  During the 1920s, Packard had consistently outdistanced Cadillac.  During 
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the 1930s, they fought as equals.  After World War II, Packard appeared more often 
to see itself as competing with Buick rather than with Cadillac.   
As mentioned earlier, Packard was saved through its move down-market after 
1935.  By the end of the war, its management was apparently convinced that that the 
upper-middle price segment would be the spring of Packard’s future success, seeing 
volume production rather than exclusivity as the most important element.109  It was an 
understandable argument.  In an economic downturn, catering to what Packard 
President George Christopher called the “carriage trade” was a severeliability and 
being a volume manufacturer was the key to success.   
Unfortunately, this turned out to be precisely the wrong strategy for the 
booming postwar period.  Packard’s big problems in the late 1940s were to be supply 
problems, particularly supplies of steel.  In retrospect, it seems that Packard would 
have been better served to use its limited supplies to build cars that would have 
rebuilt its pedigree as a quality manufacturer.  It did not take appreciably more steel 
to produce a expensive car as it did to build a middle of the road machine – and the 
profit margin was far higher on the luxury car.  Since anything coming out of the 
factory with four wheels and an engine found a willing buyer between 1945 and 
1949, this would have left Packard with a higher profit margin, instead of slowly 
bleeding to death when production targets consistently went unmet. 
Packard advertising also appeared to be rather “middle-brow”.  Where 
Packard advertising was clearly crafted for the elite in the 1920s, Packard ads of the 
1940s and early 1950s were clearly more interested in selling a commodity than an 
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image.  When compared with the bejeweled Cadillac ads, Packard advertising wa  
lackluster.  Usually featuring an image of the car without a background to give it
context and supplemented by a number of small and rather generic drawings, they 
conveyed little information other than a general sense of pleasure.  These Packard ads 
were making mistakes that James Adams would never make, they are selling th  car 
rather than the experience of owning the car.  These could be ads for almost any car 
from a $1,300 Ford to a $3,000 Oldsmobile – they tell us why the Packard was a nice 
car to drive, but they do little or nothing to give the prospective buyer any sense of 









1950 and 1951 Packard advertising from Newsweek 
Source: Author’s Collection 
 
Packard styling and engineering did little to help the situation.  Its tradition 




of timeless beauty and changed only in detail from year to year.110   Packard’s 
restyling effort in 1948 fell far short of this mark.  The 1948 Cadillac made it look old 
the day it came off the line.  It imposed a kind of inverted bathtub style on the car that 
was similar to many others on the market.  Unfortunately, the cars that it most 
resembled were other independents fighting for their own corporate lives as the
postwar sellers’ market ended – Nash, Hudson, Kaiser-Frazier.  The 1951 to 1954 
generation looked better to most eyes, but it is also possible to detect a resemblanc  to 
a 1949 Buick with the portholes on the rear fender rather than on the hood.  In any 
case, there was little here that made a prospect make tentative plans for a trip to the 
dealer as soon as he/she saw the first one on the street. 
For generations, Packard’s long suit had been engineering.  Its straight eight 
engine was legendary for its quiet and smoothness.  It had also been around since the 
mid-1920s.  Cadillac’s 1949 high-compression V-8 was just as smooth, almost as 
quiet, and would leave the Packard standing in the dust.  In 1949, Packard crowed 
about its automatic transmission, dubbed Ultramatic.  The motoring press shared 
Packard’s high opinion.111  However, Cadillac had an automatic transmission in 1941, 
and you had to be an engineer to understand why (or even if) Ultramatic had anything 
over Hydra-Matic. 
Another Packard issue was its lack of product segmentation.  From the end of 
the war until 1953, it was virtually impossible to tell an inexpensive Packard sedan 
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from the one at the top of the line.  The primary differences were length and interior 
fittings.  In the status conscious postwar period, this was a fatal flaw.  For example, 
Packard prices (limousines and convertibles excluded) ran from $2,250 to $4,175.  
The biggest difference was seven inches of wheelbase, all of it used in the front 
fenders.  Interior and trunk space were unaffected.  The buyer who spent four 
thousand dollars was no more comfortable than the buyer who spent two thousand.  
Interior fabrics were superior on the more expensive car, but the seat frames over 
which they were spread were identical.  So was the dashboard that the driver faced.   
Simply put, in its advertising, engineering, or styling; Packard just did not 
give the buyer enough of a reason to spring for the more expensive car. 
In 1953, Packard – under the leadership of new President James J. Nance – 
would try to regain some of its luster in the luxury car world by spinning off a new 
brand, Clipper, to sell its less expensive products.  It would also produce a new high-
fashion convertible, the Caribbean to provide what modern marketers would call a 
‘halo’ effect.  The Clipper was basically trimmed down in an effort to make the 
Packard look more exclusive.  Midway through the 1953 model year, Nance 
announced a 120,000 unit production goal.112  They fell short of the goal by almost 
30,000 units.  Yet, for Packard, 1953 was a pretty good year.  It was certainly better 
than 1954, with its dismal 31,291 output. 
Finally, in 1955, Packard came out with the car it should have had in 1951.  It 
featured Packard’s first V-8, which broke no new ground but was a thoroughly 
competent powerplant.  The new styling was far more modern, and was available in 
                                                




tri-tone paint schemes.  The real news, however, was a suspension system that 
amazed the motoring press.  This combination of torsion bars and a “levelizer” 
represented a huge advance in creating a smooth, level ride.  Even some in the non-
motoring press believed that this could be a real game-changer.113  Packard doubled 
its advertising budget to announce that “Nothing on earth rides like the new 
Packard.”114 
It was not to be.   For the last decade, Packard had been a rather tired also-ran, 
and its name no longer summoned the respect that it had before the war.  Packard’s 
ill-considered marriage to Studebaker in 1954 brought stability to neither partner.115  
Serious production problems plagued the company as it was rolling out the new car.  
The diminished dealer network had trouble getting the credit to buy the cars the 
factory needed to sell.  Nance thought that the advertising program was lackluster.  In 
the end, 55,517 units rolled out of the factory gate, not enough to save Packard.  The 
next year was worse.  Packards would be marketed in 1957 and 1958, but these were 
little more than rebadged Studebakers with the Packard V-8 and no one was fooled.  
There were no 1959 Packards of any stripe. 
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Groping toward an image – Lincoln and Imperial 
Lincoln after the war was in some ways worse off than Packard.  As stated
above, Lincoln’s parent firm – Ford Motor Company – was in chaos when the war 
ended.  The Ford Motor Company did its first postwar across the board restyling for 
the 1949 model year.  The 1949 Ford had a simple, almost minimalist design that was 
well received.  The 1949 Mercury, for the first time since its 1939 debut, was 
significantly different stylistically from the Ford.  Its design, too, had broad appeal 
and has since become iconic, owing in part to its being driven by James Dean in 
Rebel Without a Cause.  It is hard to look at the 1949-1951 Lincoln without thinking 
that the Ford designers had simply run out of ideas.  It was divided into two series.  
The upper series, dubbed the Cosmopolitan, was stylistically forgettable, being 
perhaps the purest form of the inverted bathtub ever to roll down the road.  The lower 
series, which Ford did not even bother to give a model designation, took the Mercury 
body and put the Cosmopolitan’s grille on it. 
 
 






1950 Lincoln advertising from Newsweek.  The 1950’s were little changed from the 
1949’s. 
Cosmopolitan is on the left, lower series on the right. 





At least the advertising for the Lincoln was better than Packard’s was.  Here 
the cars were given a context that related to the luxury image that Ford wanted the 
Lincoln name to carry.  But the Lincoln of this period shared a problem with Packard.  
Ford management seems to have been unsure whether the Lincoln should compete 
with Cadillac or Buick.  They wanted the volume that came with the upper-middle 
price range and the status that came with luxury.  They tried to use the Lincoln brand 
to try to do both, with mediocre results.  Production for all Lincolns was 73,507 in 
1949, but then fell off almost two-thirds, to 28,190 in 1950.   
Lincoln’s 1952 restyling was, like Packard’s 1951 effort, thoroughly 
conventional.  Actually, it was very possible to think that the 1952 Ford, Mercury, 
and Lincoln all shared a common body shell that had been “stretched” to fit three 
different wheelbases, as the 1946-1950 Packards had been.  The irony was that this 
was not the case.  The Ford engineers built three completely different body shells that 
simply looked a lot alike.  Owing to this situation, the controller of the Lincoln-
Mercury division calculated Lincoln’s amortized cost for body tooling to be six times 
that of Oldsmobile, Buick, and Cadillac.116 
Despite this, Lincoln was developing a reputation of its own as a luxury car 
that still had some sense of handling.  The 1952 sported two major engineering 
changes over its earlier counterparts.  A modern V-8 far more in line with the 
Cadillac engine replaced the “Flathead” V-8 that had been based on old Henry’s 1932 
                                                
116 Thomas E. Bonsall discusses this situation at length in Chapter 5 of his 





engine.  It also was underpinned by a substantially improved “ball joint” front 
suspension.  Lincolns did very well in the brutal Carrera Panamericana road race in
Mexico, and Ford saw that this fact became well known.  By 1955, Motor Trend 
referred to it as the “Engineer’s fine car” and mentioned that it  possessed “roadability 
unsurpassed for this class instead of higher horsepower.”117  This reputation was not, 
in and of itself, enough to displace Cadillac, but it was a considerable achievement.   
Unfortunately, this reputation would not last.  The Lincolns of the 1956-57 
generation were significantly heavier and did not handle quite as well as their 
predecessors.  In 1958, Lincoln would again be restyled in a conscious attempt to out-
Cadillac Cadillac.  Most dimensions (headroom, legroom, overall length, etc.) of the 
Lincoln were marginally greater than the corresponding dimension on the Cadillac.  
The overall effect was not pleasing and only 29,684 of the 1958 models were sold, as 
opposed to 121,778 Cadillacs. 
Chrysler seemed to be unsure as to whether it wished to keep Imperial at all.  
In 1946, as stated earlier, the Imperial line was whittled down to a very few 
limousines and nine-passenger sedans.  Imperial had never been a brand name on its 
own, but until 1955 carried the Chrysler brand with Imperial being a trim level.   
When Chrysler restyled all of its cars for 1949, it opted away from the bathtub and 
went for the box.  They did, however, give the Imperial a six passenger sedan that 
was marginally better trimmed than the next-lower New Yorker series and priced on 
the upper side of the Cadillac range.  From 1949 to 1954, the Imperial was largely 
                                                




unchanged, but gained a two-door pillarless hardtop along the way.  In a good year, it 
would sell a little over 10,000 copies and maybe half that in a bad year.   
In 1955, Chrysler Corp. shook off some of its torpor and brought out all new 
cars in all of its lines, advertising the “hundred million dollar look,” a reference to the 
supposed cost of restyling the cars.  Imperial became a brand of its own.  It still 
shared a strong family resemblance to its lesser stablemates, but it did have 
significant trim differences.  Imperial made a far more diligent attempt to match 
Cadillac model for model, except that it had no convertible until 1958 – an 
inexplicable decision given the advertising emphasis that Cadillac placed upon 
convertibles, unless Chrysler just figured that the car would sell in such miniscule 
numbers that it made no sense to offer it. 
Imperial advertising took on a far more Cadillac-like tone, although the style 
was generally less elaborate, even perhaps a little abstract with stairways to nowhere, 
classical columns supporting nothing, and chandeliers suspended from mid-air.  Only 
the car itself was concrete with a well dressed couple representing the eventual 












Imperial Advertisements from 1955 





Sales improved slightly, but were hardly stratospheric, with 11,432 copies 
produced in 1955.   
In 1957, Chrysler products underwent a change that made the “hundred 
million dollar look” look like an opening skirmish in its challenge to General Motors.  
The effect on G. M. and Harley Earl was significant, and will be discussed later.  This 
second major style change significantly increased sales, although the increase was 
short lived.  Imperial sales tripled in 1957 to 35,793 units, before settling down to a 
pace that was roughly half of the 1957 high for 1958, 1959, and 1960.  A commonly 
held belief within the automotive enthusiast community is that Chrysler production 
capacity was severely overtaxed in 1957 and that quality suffered significantly.  This, 
in turn, caused a rapid deterioration of Chrysler’s reputation which expressed itself in




Competition from below    
Even as Cadillac reached its greatest position in terms of market dominance, 
another car’s performance was about to pass it.  Ironically, it was to be another G. M. 
offering – the 1955 Chevrolet.  Prior to 1955, Chevrolet’s image was that of a 
workaday, rather uninspiring car powered by a six-cylinder engine that went back 
into the 1930s.  It had always been on the tailing edge of technical improvement, as 
witness the fact that it did not get an automatic transmission until 1950 – when all 




At the same time, the Ford V-8 was coming on fast.  By the mid-1950s, most of the 
issues left in the wake of Ford’s chaos of the 1940s had been dealt with.  Almost as 
though Henry Ford II was seeking revenge for the drubbing that his grandfather h d 
received at the hands of Chevrolet in the late 1920s, Ford was determined to displace 
Chevrolet as the best selling car in America.  Chevrolet engineering, under the 
leadership of Ed Cole, who would eventually become G. M. president, put on a full 
court press to make sure that did not happen. 
Before going to Chevrolet, Cole had been one of the engineers who played a 
major role in the revolutionary 1949 Cadillac engine discussed earlier.  He took the 
same bag of tricks to Chevrolet and designed the now-legendary Chevy small block 
V-8.  Harley Earl contributed a body that could easily be confused for a smaller, 
cleaner Cadillac, and an automotive legend was born.  Ford responded by increasing 
the power of the modern overhead-valve V-8 it had introduced the year before.  
Plymouth put the largest engine it had ever built into a limited-production series that 
it called the Fury, and the horsepower race among the “low priced three” was on.  
This was a seismic shift in the automotive landscape.  Enthusiast interest began to 
shift away from Cadillac and other high-performance luxury cars and toward less-
expensive, but no less powerful, automobiles. 
Not that Cadillac was worried.  As the 1955 model year began, Cadillac still 
had 90,000 unfilled orders left over from 1954.118  The contest that Cadillac was 
interested in was a challenge from Lincoln. 
 
 
                                                





The Continental road to El Dorado   
Lincoln’s most focused and most costly attempt to dethrone Cadillac dated 
from 1952.  A committee set up by Henry Ford II devised a strategy to overtake not 
just Chevrolet, but all of General Motors.  The plan included moving Mercury up the 
food chain to compete with Buick and the creation of a new brand, eventually dubbed 
the Edsel to do battle with Pontiac and Oldsmobile.  Lincoln was to become a more 
direct competitor of Cadillac.  At the pinnacle of the Ford revival would be a revival 
of Edsel Ford’s pre-war masterpiece, the Continental, to stake out a position above 
Cadillac in price, and hopefully prestige. 119  Put under the leadership of Henry Ford 
II’s younger brother, William Clay Ford, the program produced a clean-lined two-
door hardtop coupe that looked like nothing else on the road.  Its debut model in 1956 
also had a price like nothing else on the road, with the exception of Rolls-Royce, 
$9,695.  The nearest competitor that Cadillac had, the Eldorado Convertible cost 
$3000 less.   
As it turned out the Mark II would be a sales flop, selling 2,556 units in 1956 
and 444 in 1957 before Ford pulled the plug on it.  In retrospect, it was the wrong car 
with the wrong price.  
It was also promoted in the wrong way.   James Adams could have told them 
what was wrong.  Many people today would evaluate the two advertisements printed 
above and consider the Continental ad to be superior.  Of the two, it is the less wordy.  
The overall ad is less gaudy, more ethereal.  Continental’s line, “For the man who 
                                                




knows the secret of being inconspicuously important” appeals to higher motives.  The 
Continental is seen, perhaps, as the automotive equivalent to Philip Johnson’s glass 












However, James Adams’s ads sold a lot more cars than Johnson built houses or 
Pollack painted abstracts.  It makes sense to reevaluate the ads according to A ams’s 
criteria: 
Whatever people buy, they buy it not for the product itself; but for 
the satisfaction they hope it will give them. This applies equally to 
motor cars, to food, to clothing, to cosmetics, and so on throughout the 
range of manufactured products. 
Real merchandising success occurs when a product is advertised 
and sold on the basis of the particular type of satisfaction it may be 
expected to render. 
Cadillac cars, for instance, have been sold for decades as a lift to a 
man's pride—as a symbol of success. 
Cosmetics are bought, of course, to make women more attractive to 
men. If there were no men, there would be no market for cosmetics. 
1956 Lincoln Continental Mark II and 1956 Cadillac Convertible Ads 
Sources: Continental – Antique Automobile Club of America Library, Cadillac—National 




My experience has convinced me that advertising is most successful 
when it pictures and exploits the end results of a product-when it 
pictures the human satisfaction the product may be expected to 
render.120 
 
The Cadillac ad shows the Cadillac in isolation at the top of the page.  
However, at the bottom we see it again, or at least its most identifiable design feature, 
the fin.  We also see context – a home, a pool, and a group of attractive people 
enjoying themselves.  The Lincoln ad promotes the desire to be inconspicuous.  The 
Cadillac ad told its 1956 audience that they would be attractive, prosperous, and 
socially at ease. The Lincoln ad told this same audience that they would be invisible.  
And, just imagine it, being invisible would only cost $3000 extra.   
Cadillac’s own Motorama experience told them what they believed another 
part of the answer was.  According to enthusiast historian David W. Temple, part of 
the answer was seen by Harley Earl in 1953, “Though the [two door] Le Mans 
grabbed the attention of many during the Motorama tour, Harley Earl observed that 
those who would actually ‘back up their approval with a check’ showed a preference 
for the [four door] Orleans.”121  The reaction to following year’s Park Avenue was 
similar.  By this time, the coming of the Continental had become one of Detroit’s 
worst kept secrets, and the decision was made to work toward production. 
Had G. M. known that the Continental Mark II would lay a giant egg, perhaps 
the Cadillac Eldorado Brougham would never have been built.  At the time, though, 
there was the very real fear that Cadillac could be caught flat-footed and allow 
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Lincoln to establish a niche in the highest end of the luxury car market.  The heirs of 
the men who had built the V-16 knew the effect that a “halo” product could have.  
Under the circumstances, Cadillac had to develop an ultra-luxury car of their own, 
and the Motorama’s Orleans pointed the way that they would go.  The car that would 
become the 1957 Eldorado Brougham would be one of the most carefully developed 
models in the history of the industry. 
Given that a titanic battle for luxury dominance appeared to be heating up 
between G. M. and Ford, it was natural that there would be much whispering going 
on in the automotive press.  Unlike Harley Earl’s 1928 LaSalle or William Mitchell’s 
1938 Cadillac Sixty Special, the Eldorado Brougham would be the product of many 
stylists.  The overall parameters of the project were developed by Earl during the firs  
half of 1954.  A variety of stylists in the Cadillac studio worked within those 
parameters under the direction of Ed Glowacke.122  This was standard practice within 
G. M. Design under both Earl and Mitchell, who took over the studio when Earl 
retired in 1958.  The process was then to choose the best aspects of several designs 
and create a composite clay model.123 
 
1953 Cadillac Orleans Show Car 
Source: General Motors Historical Collection 
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1954 Cadillac Park Avenue Show Car 
Source: General Motors Historical Collection 
 
1955 Cadillac Eldorado Brougham Show Car 
Source: General Motors Historical Collection 
 
 
The Eldorado Brougham of 1955 was a kind of “progress report” on the 
project.  A special lowered chassis was delivered to the styling department and the 
actual construction of the car took about 70 days, and it was barely finished when the 
Motorama opened on January 19, 1955.  Notable additions were quad headlamps, 
then a new idea, and air suspension.  From the Park Avenue show car, the Eldorado 
Brougham borrowed its trademark brushed stainless steel roof panel.  From the 
Orleans, came the four-door system that abandoned the traditional center pillar and in 
which the rear doors were hinges at the rear and both sets of doors latched into a short 

















Views of a 1957 Eldorado Brougham 
Source: St. Louis Car Museum 
 
Meanwhile, the proposed price of the new car escalated.  Price targets of 
$8,500 and $10,000 were passed and the final product premiered at $13,074124, a 
record for a post-war American car.  At that price, the customer had a right to expect 
the finest in finish and fittings, and that is what he or she got.  There were, however, 
rather few who opted to get one.  Production never even came close to even the low 
numbers posted by the Continental.  Only 400 were built in 1957 and another 304 in 
1958.  The next year production was moved offshore.  For some reason, perhaps 
because the leaders of Cadillac were not yet ready to admit a costly mistake or in an 
attempt to give the car some continental flair, the 1959 and 1960 models were 
shipped to Italy to be bodied by the Peninfarina firm.  Only 99 were built for 1959, 
and 101 were constructed during 1960.  At that point, the project quietly died.  From 
that time on, neither Cadillac nor Lincoln would attempt to market a car in the Rolls-
Royce price range. 
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Why did Cadillac fail to make a place in the ultra-luxury market?  Obviously, 
the answers to such a question are speculative, but most likely the largest elemnt was 
the relationship between cost and price.  Very limited production simply does not 
work with modern tooling costs for reasons explored earlier.  However, there are so 
few potential customers in that market that production must be very limited.  Another 
reason for this failure is the fact that, when compared with the normally produced 
Cadillac, the Eldorado Brougham just wasn’t all that special.  Certainly, it was 
comfortable, well-assembled, and dripped with chrome, but so was the Cadillac Sixty 
Special at less than half the price. 
 
1958 Cadillac Sixty Special 
Source: http://www.mywvhome.com/web/cars/cars.htm  
 
One can, however argue that the Eldorado Brougham was not a failure at all. 
The purpose of so-called “halo” products is not necessarily to turn a profit.  Its 
development gained much favorable publicity for four years before the car went into 
production.   It also doubtless generated a certain amount of showroom traffic, if for 
no other reason than for the sheer novelty of seeing a $13,000 car.  How many of 
those lookers became buyers of lesser vehicles was difficult to ascertain then and 








The end of the era of Sloan and Earl 
Whether or not the Eldorado Brougham was considered successful, the 1957 
and 1958 Cadillacs can be said to have been Harley Earl’s swan song.  In 1958, he 
reached mandatory retirement age, but that was not the only factor.  The easiest to 
quantify are the numbers connected with the corporate disaster connected with the 
fact that the 1957 Ford outsold Chevrolet.   Ford had been thoroughly restyled, 
Chevrolet had received a heavy facelift on its 1955 body.  At Cadillac, sales decline  
as well, from 154,577 in 1956 to 146,841 in 1957, and finally to 121,778 in 1958.  In 
light of the 1958 recession, these numbers were not disastrous.  Cadillac production 
had never exceeded 100,000 until 1953.  Three factors spelled out the end of the age – 
slowing sales, the apparent loss of design leadership to Chrysler (about which more 
will be said below), and Earl’s 65th birthday came together to indicate that it was time 
for a new generation to take over.  Alfred Sloan, Harley Earl, and Harlow Curtice 
were retired; James Adams was dead. 
Given the auto industry’s long development times, it is possible that Earl still 
exerted some influence over the legendary amount of chrome that was lavished on the 
1959 Cadillac, which also featured the tallest fins in history.  However, at least one 
important source says that Earl’s influence on the 1959 was very limited.  Charles M. 
“Chuck” Jordan was the chief designer in the Cadillac Studio from October 1957 
until August 1962, and served as Chief Designer for the entire corporation from 1986-
1992.  In an interview published in 2009, he recounted the process by which the 




Harley Earl went to Europe in the summer of ’56.  Sometimes I 
liked to get away during lunchtime to collect my thoughts, so one day I 
drove to the Plymouth factory about seven miles away.  I thought to 
myself that these guys must be making their next year's model by now. 
I think I'll go down and look to see what I can see. 
What a shock!  There were all these '57 Plymouths backed up 
against the fence and all I could see were fins.  But it was more than the 
fins.  These cars were really sleek, they were lean and they looked like 
they were moving standing still.  The roof was very thin and they had 
that simplicity and dash that our cars didn't have.  Our cars looked 
cumbersome and heavy and didn't have that contemporary design 
quality. 
I went back to Bill Mitchell and said, "Bill, you better come down 
and look at what the Plymouth guys are doing for '57."  So a couple of 
chief designers, Bill Mitchell and I went down there and looked at those 
Plymouths that afternoon.  Keep in mind that we were already working 
on our '59 models that looked like an evolution of the '57 and '58 
models. 
That same afternoon, Bill started a second '59 design in each 
production studio.  Of course, Bill didn't stop Earl's designs, but he 
started a competing design that reflected a more advanced look.  We 
really worked fast and hard to get the new design developed in clay.  
By the time Harley Earl got back and walked into the studio, he was 
speechless, and he turned around and walked back out.  It was a couple 
of days before he realized he'd better join the party and saw the 
advantages of what we were doing. 
And you know what happened?  The '59 cars were spectacular!  On 
the Cadillac, we probably overcooked the design of the fin.  Still, it was 
tame compared to what it could have been.  I can remember when the 
fin on the clay model was higher than the coupe roof.125 
 
 By 1960, the fins were lowered and the use of chrome was far more 
restrained.  Clearly a corner had been turned. 
This is not to say that some sort of golden age at Cadillac ended when the 
aforementioned gentlemen passed from the scene.  During the 1960s and 1970s, 
Cadillac would sell in numbers that would have made Nicholas Dreystadt’s head spin.  
The division that Dreystadt had been brought in to save because it sold only 6,736 
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cars in 1933 passed annual production of 200,000 in 1966, and over 300,000 in 1973, 
the model year that ended days before the first Arab oil embargo.  When William 
Mitchell retired in 1977, Cadillac was enjoying a model year in which it would set yet 
another record, with production of 358,487. 
It is, however, highly unlikely that these records would have been set without 
the work of the men who figure so largely in this paper.  It was during this period, 












Chapter 4:  Conclusions 
 
It is my purpose in this conclusion to restate and reinforce the thesis given in 
the introduction of this paper.  My central thesis is that a combination of advertising, 
styling, engineering, and G. M.’s corporate structure took Cadillac from one luxury 
car among many to being the undisputed leader in the luxury car sector of the market.   
1.  Cadillac’s advertising presented a consistent picture of the product as one 
of the keys to the “better life” that many, perhaps most Americans desired du ing the 
first fifteen years following World War II.   This was especially credible in the 
consumer’s mind because it was a theme that was consistent with Cadillac’s 
advertising themes used before the war.  
2.  The amount of Cadillac advertising made Cadillac a household term 
describing something that was the best of its type.  Appendix C shows that Cadillac 
was occasionally outspent – by Packard in 1951 and 1953 and by Lincoln in 1953 and 
1954 – but Cadillac’s was usually the loudest voice and Cadillac’s spending shows 
the most consistently growing advertising budget.  
3.  All of Cadillac’s competitors suffered from a lack of consistency in their 
advertising and marketing – in tone, in message, and in spending (see Appendix D).   
When Packard, Imperial, and – to a lesser extent – Lincoln went down-market they 
found it very difficult, in Packard’s case impossible, to move back up-market when 
conditions for such a move improved.  Also corporate turmoil – at Ford in the 1930s 
and 1940s, at Chrysler and Packard in the mid-1950s – was a detriment compared to 
G. M.’s relatively consistent governance structure after 1921 under the leadership of 




4.  Cadillac was able to go down-market without having its image as a maker 
of premium cars suffer.  The extent to which Cadillac went down-market can be seen 
in Appendix E.  Cadillac’s first venture down-market was with a separate nampl te, 
LaSalle, which was presented as being manufactured by Cadillac, but not that it 
actually was a Cadillac.  This meant that LaSalle could advertise on the basis of price, 
but Cadillac could get away without doing so.  Only in 1940-42 was Cadillac 
extensively advertised on price, but this was abandoned after World War II.  When 
price was mentioned, the overall theme was that it was surprisingly low for a car with 
Cadillac’s quality. 
5.  For the most part, Cadillac’s products were able to live up to their 
reputation as well designed, comfortable, powerful, and well constructed 
automobiles.  
6.  General Motors could provide legions of satisfied customers, some of 
whom gained the means to live an upper-middle-class lifestyle.  Most likely relatively 
few climbed every rung of the product ladder starting with Chevrolet, then moving on 
to Pontiac, Oldsmobile, to Buick, and finally Cadillac.  However, G. M.’s product 
policy, going back to the 1920’s was to slot its cars at the top of the price class to 
which the cars belonged.  This gave G. M. a reputation as a purveyor of quality 
products, and Cadillac benefitted from that reputation. 
7.  Cadillac’s styling presented a consistently modern appearance without 
scaring its inherently conservative clientele.  With the possible exceptions of 1957 
and 1959, Cadillacs changed just enough to distinguish themselves from the previous 




Appendix E).  The fins, which were at first the most radical part of the 1948 redesign 
changed only incrementally through 1956.  When the fin was drastically changed in 
1957, the appearance of the front of the car carried strong echoes of 1956.  This did 
two things, both of them redounding to Cadillac’s benefit.  First, it reassured this 
year’s customer that his new car would not appear to be hopelessly outclassed in less 
than a year’s time.  Second, it gave Cadillac a good reputation for retaining a healthy 
part of its value when the time came to trade one in.  This would then make it easier 
to sell another new Cadillac to that customer in two- or three-year’s time. It would 
also provide an entrée for the customer who wanted to enter the world of Cadillac but 
could not quite swing it financially to purchase a gently used two- or three-year-old 
vehicle – from which he/she could perhaps trade up to a new vehicle sometime in the 
future. 
8.  Cadillac consistently made new technologies available to its customers.  
Among these were high compression V-type engines, automatic transmissions, power 
steering, power brakes, air conditioning, and cruise control which have become 
standard parts of the modern driving experience.  Others, such as the “Autronic Eye” 
(an automatic headlamp dimming system) and air suspension proved to be less 
durable.   This was one of the benefits of sitting atop the G. M. pyramid.  Anything 
that another division was working on could and did become available on Cadillac as 
soon as it became available on one of the “lesser” cars in the G. M. line, and usually
well ahead of Packard, Lincoln, or Imperial.   Another related benefit was Cadillac’s 




be sold in a shorter period of time.  This advantage was particularly important in its 
competition with Packard, which had no corporate parent to pick up some of its costs.   
9. Cadillac had momentum.  It is a truism that success breeds success.  
Cadillac successfully became a part of the “Roaring 20s”, which helped it 
successfully navigate the Great Depression, which in turn helped it successfully 
convert to peacetime consumption, which helped it is proclaim itself as something 
more than a car – it had become a sign of a life successfully lived. 
On the other hand, one has to ask whether it could have done better.  Did 
Cadillac (or General Motors) make any mistakes that retarded what could have been 
greater success?   
1.  In light of more recent events, it appears that the decision to drop the 
LaSalle was a mistake.  When the subject arises, the conventional wisdom vindicates 
the decision by pointing to the fact that the LaSalle’s replacement in the Cadillac line, 
the 1941 Cadillac Model 61, handily outsold the 1940 LaSalle.  This line of analysis 
ignores two factors.  First, as pointed out above, LaSalle sales were on a steady and 
strong upward course from 1938 to 1940, and there is no reason to believe that this 
trend would not have continued into 1941.  Second, there is the fact that 1941 was 
significantly better than 1940 for all Cadillac lines except the Series Sixty.  For 
instance, Cadillac’s Model 62 line, positioned one notch above the LaSalle/Model 61, 
posted 5,900 sales in 1940 and 24,726 in 1941.   
That the LaSalle brand long continued to retain a certain amount of brand 
loyalty can be seen in that there were at least three attempts to revive it – n two small 




became the 1963 Buick Rivera after being finally rejected by Cadillac management, 
and in the car that was badged as the Cadillac Seville in 1975.126  That this lingering 
loyalty may have extended beyond the halls of General Motors can be seen in the 
theme song for the wildly popular 1970s television series, All in the Family, in whose 
theme song the main character, Archie Bunker, crooned, “Gee, our old LaSalle ran 
great.  Those were the days.” 
It is my contention that the LaSalle could have provided a badge that could 
have stopped, or at least slowed, the kind of brand erosion that Cadillac suffered in 
later decades.  By continuing LaSalle, Cadillac would still have had a vehicle that 
could have served as a test bed for marketing and mechanical innovation without 
risking the prestige of the senior brand. It had, after all, served this function from 
1927-1934.  Perhaps such services were little needed in the halcyon post-World War 
II days, but one can argue that it would have helped keep Cadillac from becoming 
typed as an “old man’s car” in the 1960s.  By the 1980s, Cadillac badly needed the 
resources that a strong LaSalle brand could have provided.    
2.  It can be argued that the money spent on the El Dorado Brougham of 1957-
1960 was largely wasted.  A very low volume car with an extremely high price, the El 
Dorado was not significantly more luxurious than other Cadillacs and had to bear 
enormous tooling costs.  It, and the Continental with which it was designed to 
compete, seemed to be an answer to an automotive question that nobody asked. 
                                                
126 The LaSalle Show car is discussed in Temple, G. M.’s Motorama, pages 
132-135; the Riviera background in Auto Editors of Consumers Guide, Encyclopedia 




3.  I believe that the 1955 Chevrolet and its successors were very popular 
mistakes, at least when viewed from the Cadillac perspective.  Much of Cadillac’s 
appeal stemmed from its air of exclusivity and power – both mechanical and social.  
The post-1955 Chevrolets were nearly as powerful and could be very well equipped 
at a price that was about 60% of the Cadillac.  They didn’t carry the same prestige, 
but they did open the door to the position that a Cadillac was only a dressed up 
Chevrolet. 
4.  It does seem that there was more than a little complacency that crept into 
General Motors as a whole and Cadillac in particular by the mid-1950s.  After being 
pioneers in the production of cars with automatic transmissions, power steering, 
power brakes, etc. through 1953 or so; engineering development at Cadillac was 
nearly static thereafter.  An air suspension developed for the El Dorado Brougham 
proved to be unreliable, and the absence of a list of engineering accomplishments 
after that indicated that General Motors just wasn’t trying very hard.  The sociologist 
Robert F. Freeland makes a strong case that this was the result of two major changes 
that happened in G.M. upper management – the retirement of Alfred Sloan and his 
eventual replacement in 1958 by Frederic Donner and the forced divestiture by 
DuPont of its holdings in G. M. in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1956 decision in 
U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, General Motors, et al.  Placing Donner in the 
Chairman’s office put undue power in the hands of the finance sector of the company 
and stifled product development.  Removing DuPont’s ownership influence deprived 
G. M. of the long-term view that having an ownership block that was not part of the 




suspicious “memoir,” On a Clear Day, You Can See General Motors makes the 
effects of the corporate ennui that ensued one of its major themes.  
The relative importance of these factors – and other historians may well see 
factors that I have missed – may be debatable.  What is undeniable is the fact tat 
Cadillac was amazingly successful.  Its model year 1960 production of 142,184 gave 
it 70% of the U.S. luxury car market (verses Lincoln’s 24,823 and Imperial’s 17,719) 
– testimony enough of Cadillac’s commanding position in the marketplace. 
That leaves us with one pertinent question yet remaining.  What happened, 
why has Cadillac lost the commanding position that it once held? 
For starters, Cadillac lost its position of exclusivity.  This happened primarily 
in three ways.   
First, Cadillac production rose to the point where 1956’s banner year would 
have been an unmitigated disaster in 1976.127  An air of exclusivity is a necessary 
component to the ethereal concept of luxury.  If everyone can get it, it is no longer 
desired by those who want “something better.”    
Second, Cadillacs were sufficiently well built that they tended to last a long 
time.  Normally that should be an advantage.  For Cadillac, it meant that one of its 
cars might go through three or four owners, each one less prosperous than the last.  
An anecdote from my own childhood serves to illustrate this point.  In 1965, the 
poorest family on our block drove a salmon colored 1958 Cadillac Sedan de Ville.  Its 
paint was faded, it was beginning to rust out, and the block letters spelling out the 
car’s brand name on top of the left fin was missing the first L and the second A.  My
                                                
127 Production figures for 1956 ran to 154,577.  Those for 1976 were almost 




father, the owner of a new 1965 Ford Galaxie 500, looked upon that Cadillac with 
contempt – and had no trouble voicing his opinion about it.  It finally died an 
ignominious death a year or so later. 
Perhaps the most important reason that Cadillac lost its exclusivity, though, is 
the fact that G.M. management did not maintain it.  This went back to Chevrolet’s 
successful use of Cadillac-like styling in 1955, but did not really hit full stride until 
the mid-1960s, when Chevrolet began to market its Caprice model.  With an available 
427 cubic inch engine and luxurious interior trimmings it sold well – and gave 
potential purchasers another reason NOT to climb G. M.’s price ladder.  By 1976, 
there was an astonishing similarity between the Chevrolet Caprice, the Pontiac Grand 
Ville, the Oldsmobile 98 Regency, the Buick Electra 225, and the Cadillac Sedan de 
Ville.  The way to sell more Cadillacs was to lower its price; the way to sell more of 
the others was to make them more like a Cadillac. 
Another set of reasons that Cadillac lost out was that the sort of luxury it 
represented lost favor with the “baby boomer” generation.  Many too many barrels of 
ink have been spilled in describing the tone of anti-materialism of the late 1960’s for 
me to go into any detail about it here.  It is enough to say that the kind of glamour that 
James Adams depicted in all of those ads had ceased to be attractive.  Cadillac was 
the symbol of an age that was being derided by the sons and daughters of those who 
had made Cadillac so very successful.   
Another key reason for Cadillac’s decline was that Cadillac ceased offering its 
buyers anything new.  Once cars had automatic transmissions, power steering, power 




there just didn’t seem to be any more to offer.  By the late 1960s, automotive 
innovation, to the extent that there was any automotive innovation was centered in 
smaller cars, performance in the 1964 Pontiac G.T.O., fuel saving in the 1970 
Chevrolet Vega, etc.  This was coupled with the fact that government mandates 
forced the auto manufacturers to focus their engineering resources on decreasing 
pollution and providing safer vehicles.  These changes were necessary, but they were 
very expensive, and they didn’t possess any of the “gee-whiz” factor that had 
accompanied the first experience of driving without having to shift or of steering with 
two fingers.  In fact, they had the initial effect of making cars less powerful and less 
fun to drive.128  Another factor was that by law they had to be applied to all cars at the 
same time, denying Cadillac the opportunity to appear advanced compared with less 
expensive cars. 
Then came the 1980s and 1990s when most of what Cadillac offered that was 
new was also bad.  G. M. faced a corporate debacle when the initially popular diesel 
engines that it offered in all of its lines, including Cadillac, turned out to be 
progressively less reliable once they got a few miles on them.  Cadillac’s V-8-6-4 
variable displacement engine offered increased fuel economy by only running on as 
many cylinders as the conditions required – more when accelerating, fewer when 
cruising at a steady speed.  It was a sound concept, but was rushed to market befo e 
the dealers’ service technicians could be properly trained in their maintenance, 
causing another round of early failures. 
                                                
128 Cadillac’s basic engine for 1968 had a power output of 375 horsepower.  In 
1971 that figure was cut to 345.  The 1972 put out 220 hp., the 1974 had 205, and the 
1975 had 190.  The effect of a nearly 50% drop in power output, even though the car 




Most of Cadillac’s forays into the world of smaller cars fared little better.  The 
1981-1986 Cimarron was a thinly veiled four-cylinder Chevrolet.  This was even 
worse than the design mistakes described above.  Making a Chevrolet look like a 
Cadillac at least made sense from some perspective, making a Cadillac look like a 
Chevy was just wrong-headed.  The same year, Cadillac substantially downsized it  
expensive Seville and Eldorado series.  Other than the grille and the crest, ther was 
little in the new design that spoke to any Cadillac styling tradition and the cars were 
fundamentally bland.  The first year of the change saw Seville sales cut in half and 
Eldorado sales go down by more than three-quarters.  In 1996, Cadillac tried again to 
build a small car that would be somewhat sporty and still be a Cadillac when it 
introduced the Catera.  Imported from G. M.’s German Opel division, the “Caddy that 
zigs”129 did not look like anything else that G. M. sold in America, but there its 
virtues stopped.  Quality was spotty, some drivers swore by it – others swore at it, and 
another opportunity was lost.130  
More recently, there have been signs that Cadillac is coming back.  The 
current Cadillac CTS appears to actually be the car that the Catera was suppo ed to be 
– a car that a B.M.W. driver would look at and consider purchasing.131  
Unfortunately, the rest of Cadillac’s line-up is dismissed as rather lackluster, 
                                                
129 Catchphrase from 1996 Catera television advertising. 
130  Cadillac history since the 1970s is still largely in the province of 
enthusiast historians.  Perhaps the most concise treatment of Cadillac in the 1980s is 
David Holls’s appendix to Hendry’s Cadillac.  Holls played a role in designing the 
1959 Cadillac and became the head of G. M. Design in 1992.  Since he may be 
labeled as a G. M. partisan, his view should be read with considerable discernment.    
131  Fairly typical of the reception that the CTS has gotten from the motoring 






including the DTS that replaced the big-volume deVille line.  In the midst of G. M.’s 
bankruptcy woes in the summer of 2009, Bryan Nesbitt was named to be Cadillac’s 
General Manager.   As a designer, rather than an engineer or and accountant, 
Nesbitt’s resume is very different from anyone who has ever run Cadillac.  He is also 
unusual in that he did some of his best known work for someone other than General 
Motors, having designed the successful Chrysler PT Cruiser in the late 1990s.  
Nesbitt will also have a level of power that no Cadillac General Manager has had in 
decades, in that he will report directly to Vice-Chairman Robert Lutz.132 
If Cadillac is able to regain a place of prominence among manufacturers of 
luxury automobiles, it will be highly significant, in that no other manufacturer had 
managed such a move.  It is possible to go from nothing to acceptance as a luxury 
marque, as B.M.W. did in the 1980s and Lexus in the 1990s.  What has thus far 
eluded Cadillac, and Lincoln as well, is the path to gaining that acceptance after a 
period in which the market has determined that you are no longer an important player.  
The CTS, encouraging as it must be to Cadillac management, is a small car.  As such 
it may well prove to be a fine entre vehicle, but Cadillac still needs a large c  that 
can compete with the Mercedes S-Class, the B.M.W. 7-series, and the Lexus LS.  In 
2003, Cadillac unveiled a concept car called the Sixteen, intended to evoke memories 
of the V-16 of the 1930s while being a thoroughly modern car.  It attracted 
considerable notice in the automotive press, much of it positive.  Yet six years latr, 
its influence on the large DTS line has yet to be seen. 







1993 Cadillac Sixteen Concept 
Source: G. M. Heritage Collection 
 
It may well turn out that the real penalty of leadership that Theodore 



































In every field of human endeavor, he that is first must perpetually live in the white 
light of publicity. Whether the leadership be vested in a man or in a manufactured 
product, emulation and envy are ever at work. In art, in literature, in music, in 
industry, the reward and the punishment are always the same. The reward is 
widespread recognition; the punishment, fierce denial and detraction. When a man’s 
work becomes a standard for the whole world, it also becomes a target for the shafts 
of the envious few. If his work be merely mediocre, he will be left s verely alone - if 
he achieve a masterpiece, it will set a million tongues a-wagging. Jealousy does not 
protrude its forked tongue at the artist who produces a commonplace painting. 
Whatsoever you write, or paint, or play, or sing, or build, no one will strive to surpass 
or to slander you, unless your work be stamped with the seal of genius. Long, long 
after a great work or a good work has been done, those who are disappointed or 
envious continue to cry out that it cannot be done. Spiteful little voices in the domain 
of art were raised against our own Whistler as a mountebank, long after the big world 
had acclaimed him its greatest genius. Multitudes flocked to worship at the shrine of 
Wagner, while the little group of those whom he had dethroned and displaced argued 
angrily that he was no musician at all. The little world continued to protest that Fulton 
could not build a steamboat, while the big world flocked to the river to see his boat 
steam by. The leader is assailed because he is the leader, and the effort to equal him is 
merely added proof of that leadership. Failing to equal or to excel, the follower seeks 
to depreciate and to destroy - but only confirms once more the superiority of that 
which he strives to supplant. There is nothing new in this. It is as old as the world and 
as old as the human passions - envy, fear, greed, ambition, and the desire to surpass. 
And it all avails nothing. If the leader truly leads, he remains - the leader. Master-
poet, master-painter, master-workman, each in his turn is assailed, nd each holds his 
laurels through the ages. That which is good or great makes itself known, no matter 












He is now 46 years old. 
He was born, here in Detroit, in 1908, That was sixteen years after the first 
popping, lurching, horseless carriage swerved through the streets of Springfield, 
Massachusetts, 
The neighborhood blacksmith was thinking of turning his shop into a garage. 
Sometimes father was heard singing "In My Merry Oldsmobile" from the ki chen 
bathtub. 
Left-hand steering and the baked enamel finish were just being introduced. And 
automobiles were toys—limited to the city, by the roads—and, by their cost, to the 
rich. 
The year he was born, General Motors was born. 
When he was a year old, electric headlights, four-door touring car bodies, dash-
panel oil gauges, made their first appearance. And when he was two, Buick built its 
first six-cylinder car. 
He was four when Cadillac introduced the electric self-starter, six when it built 
the first high-speed V-8 engine, seven when it brought out tilt-beam headlights. Of 
course, he didn't particularly note this, He was too busy growing. 
When he was ten, his family bought their first Chevrolet. 
After that, his world really began to spin. There were these great weekends at the 
lake and vacations on the farm. New roads, straight and flat, were stretching out, 
connecting everywhere. 
By the time he and General Motors were fifteen, there were balloon tires, Buicks 
with four-wheel brakes, a new auto finish called Duco lacquer, a new gasoline called 
Ethyl. And be was living in a new bungalow in the suburbs out past Grand Boulevard.  
Because now the distance was no inconvenience. 
At sixteen, on his way to Boy Scout Summer camp, he saw a new thing named the 
General Motors Proving Ground, and in the next four years he saw some of its 
products—the first Pontiac car, an Oldsmobile wearing the first chrome plate, a 
Cadillac with the first synchro-mesh transmission, a new six-cylinder Chevrolet. 
Then he and GM both turned 21 in the year of the crash-1929. 
It didn't seem the time to come of age, But there is no progress without faith and 
they had come too far to give up. He saw the advent of No-Draft ventilation in Bodies 




Top. Sure enough, the same drive to give customers better values that had meant 
growth in the twenties, meant growth, and employment, in the thirties. 
He knew, because he had seen it coming, because his employer was a GM 
supplier, because he was a GM customer. He saw the new Delco car radios come out, 
then the new Sealed-Beam headlamps, and by the time of the Hydra-Matic Drive, the 
depression had just about been weathered. 
Unfortunately, right around the corner lay another crash—Pearl Harbor. 
He was 33 and married and he didn't go at first. In this respect he was different; 
GM had already gone to war. And when he did get to Camp Hood it was in a GM 
6x6, carrying a GM carbine. 
Before he got home GM navy fighters and torpedo bombers had flown cover over 
his convoy. He had walked behind GM tanks, bearing the rocketing thunder of GM 
shells up ahead. There was a brief ride in a GM ambulance. And then eventually that 
storm bad been weathered too. 
He was hard at work on his 39th birthday, planting new shrubs around the new 
house in the new suburb. The growing city had surrounded the old home, but moving 
farther out had been no problem. 
Distances were briefer than ever. The next year he followed the announcement of 
Buick's Dyna-Flow drive, the curved-glass windshields of the Cadillac and 
Oldsmobile. 
Then on his 42nd birthday he took the family for a drive in their new Chevrolet 
with Powerglide automatic transmission. They went through the old neighborhood, 
along Grand Boulevard, past the block-square General Motors Building, and recalled 
the time when this had been near open countryside. Wheels had shrunk the distances 
so—had wrought such change. 
His own kids are growing up now, talking car talk. They devour the ads and 
exclaim about power steering, power braking. Their innocent acceptance of the 
convertible with the powered top and powered windows reminds him of the "one-man 
top" and isinglass curtain, of his own youth. 
He recalls why it is he is standing there, looking in, the man at the window. 
He has come down to pickup his new car, the one with the Sweep-Sight 
windshield. The one with the ground-hugging ride—silent, sturdy, and automatic 
beyond belief. The one with the sparkling finish and brilliant performance. The one 
that took 48 years - GM's years, his years — to build. He sees its counterpart in 
through the window and admires it. 
But before he comes in, he allows himself one more reminiscence. The 




family trademark. All that it stands for in the spanning of time and space is in hi 
hands-together with a comfort of springs and foam and music and climate — together 
with a guarding of welded steel, triple-plate glass, flashing turn-signals, enormous 
brakes — together with a dazzling beauty never before known. And he saw it happen. 
Now, perhaps you think he is breathing a kind of thanks for this — thanks to 
General Motors. And perhaps he is. And that's just fine. But the battle for abundance 
in America was not GM's alone. 
In a democracy, if an institution is to grow, it must give the public what it wants, 
at a price it wants to pay. There is no other basis... 
The man at the window has followed the growth of General Motors — has seen it 
hailed through the newspapers, on the poster panels, over the radio, in the magazines, 
across the television screens. And it is he who has built General Motors because he 
liked what he read, and heard, and saw. Because it gave him what he wanted at a 
price he wanted to pay. 
Now, today, there is the 50,000,000th GM car — a glittering, golden Chevrolet 
Bel Air sport coupe. Because, yesterday, the man at the window bought number 
49,999,999. 
And that isn't a bad system. 
CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY 
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Appendix C – A Love Affair with Cadillac 
 
The following is a brief history of Cadillac prepared by General Motors Public 
Relations department and posted on their website, G. M. Media Online 
http://media.gm.com/us/cadillac/en/company/love.html.  It is included so that the 
reader may contrast the findings in this paper with those from an “official” source.  
This narrative is, perhaps, most interesting for what it has left out.  There is, for 
instance, no mention of either the Cimarron or the V-8-6-4 engine. 
 
The story of Cadillac begins in New England where founder Henry Leland worked in 
the Springfield Armory during the Civil War as a mechanic and later with Browne & 
Sharpe as a precision machinist. After moving to Detroit, this entrepreneur started 
Leland and Faulconer, manufacturing castings, forgings, automotive engines and 
chassis components.  
When the backers of the Detroit Automobile Company wanted to liquidate that 
company, Leland provided the estimate, but recommended that they not go out of 
business. Instead, he helped them create the Cadillac Motor Car Company, named 
after Le Sieur Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac, the founder of the city of Detroit. In just 
a few months, the very first Model A Cadillac was exhibited at the New York 
Automobile Show in January 1903. 
While the Model A was a good first effort, it was the 1905 Model D that moved 
Cadillac into prominence. Powered by a four-cylinder engine, the five-passenger 
touring car had a wood body with an aluminum skin available as an option. 
In 1908, three Cadillacs entered the competition for the Dewar Trophy, awarded 
annually for the most significant automotive advancement. Before this time, parts 
were hand-fitted by filing and sanding. Cadillacs featured the first interchangeable 
parts. Three cars were completely disassembled, the parts scrambled and 90 service 
parts exchanged and then put back together. This innovation helped Cadillac endure 
the 500-mile trial that followed, and to win the Dewar Trophy. 
Another significant milestone happened in 1908 when General Motors made an offer 
to purchase Cadillac. On July 29, 1909, General Motors acquired Cadillac for 
$5,969,200. GM President William C. Durant asked the Lelands to continue as 
managers and to operate the company as if it were their own. 
About the same time, the Fleetwood Metal Body Company was formed in Fleetwood, 
Pa. Even then, Cadillac products with sophisticated Fleetwood custom bodies were 
built for affluent customers, including movie stars, on chassis supplied by Pierce-





The introduction of the first regular production closed-bodied cars by Cadillac in 
1910 was also seen as a benefit to drivers. The self-starter was introduced on 1912 
Cadillacs, making it easier for men and women to drive cars because they didn’t have 
to crank start them. Cadillac proudly won the Dewar Trophy a second time, this time 
for its electric starting-lighting-ignition system. 
1920-1930 
Cars with style and elegance  
Cadillac production exceeded 20,000 in 1922. Part of that sales success came from 
the introduction of the Type 61 that came equipped with a standard windshield wiper 
and rear view mirror. A new era in automobile design was beginning in the Roaring 
Twenties with the influence of Harley Earl, who established the first styling 
department by an automobile manufacturer, the General Motors Art and Colour 
Section, in 1927. 
Former General Motors Director of Styling David Holls said, “Before 1927, Cadillac 
was a good, solid, substantial car. After 1927, the cars had style and elegance.” 
Earl began his work at Cadillac by designing the smaller, very stylish LaSalle in 
1927. Created to fill the gap between Buick and Cadillac in the General Motors 
lineup, the LaSalle was advertised as a “Companion Car to Cadillac.” LaSalle was 
always considered to be a sportier, more maneuverable Cadillac, similar to the 
modern Cadillac Catera. 
Cadillac LaSalle was the pace car at the 1927 Indianapolis 500. This was the fir t 
time a Caddy would pace the race, but certainly not the last. Cadillacs or LaSalles 
would be the pacesetters five more times, in 1931 (Cadillac Model 370 V12), 1934 
(LaSalle), 1937 (LaSalle), 1973 (Eldorado), and 1992 (Allante). 
In its initial year, LaSalle offered eleven body styles on two wheelbases, plus four 
Fleetwood designs on a 125-inch wheelbase. LaSalle coupes even had a door on the 
side that opened to provide a compartment for golf bags. 
Another Cadillac innovation was the first clashless synchromesh transmission in 
1929. Now drivers didn’t have to double clutch their cars to avoid grinding gears. 
1930-1940 
Focusing on the driver and passengers  
The Cadillacs of the Thirties defined classic American sophistication and luxury. 
With the introduction of V12 and V16 engines, Cadillac led the industry in 
performance and engineering excellence. Designed by Owen Nacker, the V16 engine 
powered some of the most exciting Cadillac automobiles. This engine wasn’t the only 
innovative feature, because 1930 V16s also included the first vacuum-assisted 




Cadillac continued to pioneer and exert its leadership in other important engineering 
advances in this decade. Work began on the automatic transmission at Cadillac in 
1932. In 1933, the first independent front suspension appeared on an experimental 
Cadillac and became a standard feature on the GM lineup for 1934. 
Bill Mitchell, then only 24 years old, designed the new 1938 Cadillac 60 Special. 
Bigger than a LaSalle, the 60 special deleted running boards, featured thin window 
pillars, chrome-plated door window frames, and was designed to be the transition 
from chauffeur-driven to owner-driven luxury cars. This car would set styling treds 
for more than a decade. 
1940-1950 
The war years and the good times that followed  
Sophistication, performance and comfort set new standards for the 1941 cars from 
Cadillac. That year, Cadillac first offered the hydramatic automatic tr nsmission, as 
well as air conditioning and a gas tank filler cleverly hidden under the left taillight. 
Cadillac stopped all civilian automotive production in February 1942 to join the war 
effort on the homefront. In just 55 days, the first tank powered by two Cadillac V8 
engines and two hydramatic transmissions rolled off the line at the Clark Avenue 
factory in Detroit. Other wartime products included M-8 howitzer carriages, th  1944 
M-24 light tank and components for the V12 Allison Aircraft engine. Even General 
Douglas MacArthur’s staff car was a Cadillac, a Series 75. 
After the war, cars from Cadillac were again ready to create a higher standard for the 
world. The 1948 Cadillacs had tailfins for the first time, modeled after the Lockheed 
P-38 fighter plane. Harley Earl had been inspired by that plane’s design and couldn’t 
wait to translate the profile to his cars. Because there was so much excitem nt about 
this design innovation, dealers would often park cars in their showrooms with the 
backs facing the window, leaving the taillights on overnight. The tailfins fromthese 
Cadillacs set design trends for decades. 
In 1949, Cadillac introduced the high-compression, short-stroke, lightweight 
“modern” V8. This engine, which was smaller, lighter and more fuel efficient, made 
Cadillac the fastest, most powerful passenger vehicle in America. At the end of the 
decade, Briggs Cunningham finished tenth overall in a standard 1950 Cadillac at 
LeMans. 
The Coupe DeVille hardtop was also introduced in 1949, earning Cadillac Motor 
Trend’s first “Car of the Year” award. 
1950-1960 




Some of the most significant Cadillacs came off the assembly line during this 
amazing decade. General Motors held its “Mid Century Motorama” at New York 
City’s elegant Waldorf Astoria Hotel in January 1950. Among the featured cars was 
the Cadillac Debutante, which was inspired by the stage play “The Solid Gold 
Cadillac.” In June of that year, Fortune magazine held a survey among its readers, 
asking the question, “What car do you think you will buy next?” Cadillac led the 
survey and also ranked “best looking” and “best value” among luxury models. 
Cadillac celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1952 with a series of “golden anniversary” 
models. The introduction of power steering as standard equipment was an engineering 
enhancement that year. 
In 1953, Cadillac introduced the Eldorado, which was the first postwar custom luxury 
car. This was a magnificent machine, with the industry’s first wraparound windshield 
and visors, or “frenched” headlights. Special equipment included a metal convertible 
boot, cutdown doors, leather upholstery, chrome wire wheels, enhanced styling and 
signal-seeking radio. The Eldorado sold for $7,750, which was considered a great 
deal of money at the time, but still an excellent investment. 
Restyling efforts to the 1954 Eldorado featured the “Dagmar” front bumper guard
design, named after the voluptuous television star of “Jerry Lester’s House Party.”
Four-way power seats were also introduced that year. 
The 1957 Eldorado Brougham was truly a custom Cadillac. This car featured new 
quad headlights and a pillarless four-door design. The center-opening doors offered 
unobstructed entry to the front or rear seats. Standard equipment included low-profile 
tires, a self-opening and closing trunk, air suspension, air conditioning, and personal 
vanities that included a small bottle of Arpege perfume. With a brushed stainless steel 
roof, the Eldorado Brougham had a look like no other car. 
Harley Earl’s 1959 Cadillac was the ultimate translation of jet aircraft design. This 
car has achieved cult status and was the subject of a U.S. Postal Service 
commemorative stamp in 1996. Fans of the Fifties look to the 1959 Cadillac as a true 
icon of that amazing decade. 
1960-1970 
Refinement and innovation  
The flamboyant tailfins continued to be refined through 1964 when Cadillac built its 
three millionth car. However, design enhancements were complemented by several
engineering innovations that were introduced in this decade. 
In 1962, Cadillac models featured cornering lights and dual circuit braking, both key 
safety innovations. Also new for 1964 was automatic climate control, which provided 
“set it and forget it” control of both air conditioning and heating. A welcome cold-





In 1967, Cadillac introduced the totally redesigned front-wheel-drive Eldorado. This 
personal luxury car was built on a completely new chassis. Higher levels of 
performance were achieved in 1968 with the new 472-cubic-inch engine and again 
with the 1970 Eldorado, which featured a 500-cubic-inch V8 engine. Track Master 
anti-skid transistorized rear braking was also available. A magazine survy ranked the 
Cadillac “most comfortable and easiest to control” among ten German, British and 
American luxury cars. 
1970-1980 
A world of new challenges  
Passenger security and environmental protection were the focus of Cadillac 
innovation in the Seventies. Fuel economy had always been a Cadillac trademark, 
despite the cars’ size and luxury. In this decade, engines were designed for better fuel 
efficiency and reduced emissions. 
In 1971, in order to reduce lead emissions that resulted from the use of premium or 
high octane gasoline, engines were designed to run on regular fuel. By 1975, the cars 
were engineered to operate using both regular unleaded fuel and pollution-reducing 
catalytic converters. 
For Cadillac’s 70th anniversary year in 1972, many styling refinements were 
introduced. An improved bumper-crash absorption system was introduced on 1973 
Cadillacs. Driver and front seat occupant safety air bags were offered in 1974, 1975 
and 1976 models. 
The five millionth Cadillac rolled off the assembly line in June 1973, and yearly 
production was running at 300,000 or more. 
Cadillac introduced the new internationally sized Seville in May 1975. This car was a
more compact and maneuverable Cadillac with generous interior dimensions and 
enhanced fuel economy. Seville featured electronic fuel injection as standard 
equipment. 
As America celebrated it 200th birthday, Cadillac introduced a bicentennial edit on of 
the Eldorado convertible. This patriotic 1976 model was white with red and blue 
pinstriping, white leather seating with red piping, and wheel discs with white inserts. 
The Eldorado for 1979 offered a combination of engineering features not found in 
any other car, including front-wheel drive, four-wheel independent suspension, and 
an electronic fuel-injected V8 engine. While shorter in length, head and leg room 
were greater in the front and rear seats, and there was more usable trunk space. 
1980-1990 




The all-new 1980 Seville featured sheer edges and dramatic styling, unlike any other 
American-built car on the road. For the first time, Seville shared a front-wheel-drive 
chassis with Eldorado. 
John O. Grettenberger, who was named general manager on January 10, 1984, would 
lead Cadillac for more than 13 years -- the longest tenure of any Cadillac general 
manager. 
As the nation began to enjoy a healthier economic climate, sales of luxury cars 
increased. Cadillac enjoyed excellent results in 1984, with calendar year sals of 
320,017. The convertible returned to Cadillac that year. Production was limited to 
2,000 Eldorado Biarritz convertibles. 
The 1987 Allante luxury two-door convertible was unique in many ways. The body 
was designed and manufactured by the Italian firm Pininfarina in Turin, Italy. Bodies 
were flown to Detroit on 747s for assembly of the powertrain and chassis, creating 
the world’s longest assembly line -- a distance of 3,300 miles. This front-wheel-drive 
sports car pioneered many Cadillac innovations, including traction control and the 
Northstar engine. 
In the late Eighties, Cadillac engineering, manufacturing and design staffs te med up 
to introduce such innovations as the elegant 1989 DeVille and Fleetwood. 
At the end of the decade, the 1989 Fleetwood featured a full range of Cadillac styling
cues: a subtle suggestion of fins along with rear fender skirts, long, low protective 
side molding treatment, a stylish chrome radiator grille, and wreath and crest. 
1990-2000 
The continuing rewards of quality  
Cadillac was once again recognized as a world leader in quality when the company 
was awarded the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award in 1990. 
Cadillac was the first automobile manufacturer to win the Baldrige and, as of 1997, 
was the only automobile manufacturer to ever receive this honor. 
In 1992, the introduction of the totally redesigned Eldorado and Seville received 
additional worldwide acclaim. Seville was the recipient of Motor Trend’s “Carof the 
Year” honors as well as numerous other awards. A year later, Cadillac again created a 
higher standard in the area of automotive engineering with the Northstar System. The 
highly acclaimed Northstar System of power and state-of-the-art technology now 
provides Cadillac drivers an unparalleled balance of efficiency, power, control ad 
safety. 
In 1993, the Fleetwood Brougham was completely redesigned and continued the 
long-standing Cadillac tradition as the choice for professional car conversions, 




In 1996, power output for the Northstar engine was increased to 300 hp in the DeVille 
Concours, Eldorado Touring Coupe and Seville STS. 
For the 1997 model year, Cadillac added StabiliTrak, an exclusive safety technology 
to the Seville STS, Eldorado Touring Coupe and DeVille Concours. In addition, 
Cadillac redesigned the DeVille, adding a new model, the d’Elegance, which offers a 
distinctive expression of classic American luxury and the highest level of comfort and 
classic luxury amenities. Side airbags were also added to all DeVille mod ls. The 
Catera, Cadillac’s entry luxury sedan, was also introduced for 1997. As Cadillac 
moves toward its second century, this innovative car company proudly continues a 
rich tradition of bringing sophistication, performance, safety and innovative 




Appendix D – Advertising Expenditures by Luxury Automobile Manufacturers 1950-
1960 
 
Source: Frederic Stuart, ed. Factors Affecting Determination of Market Shares in the 
American Automobile Industry (Hempstead, N.Y.: Hofstra University) 1965, pages 
26-28 
 
All figures in millions of dollars 
 
  Cadillac Lincoln Imperial Packard 
 
1950  2.86  1.96  -----  2.07 
 
1951  2.39  1.82  -----  3.10 
 
1952  3.67  3.14  -----  3.61 
 
1953  3.42  4.04  -----  4.16 
 
1954  3.95  4.32  -----  2.67 
 
1955  5.82  5.23  -----  5.13 
 
1956  6.80  6.12  1.50  3.77 
 
1957  6.91  4.86  1.95  0.91 
 
1958  5.93  3.56  1.97  0.22 
 
1959  6.98  3.06  2.52  ----- 
 
1960   7.20  2.79  2.41  ----- 
 
 
Notes:  Until model year 1955, Imperial was not an independent brand, being the 
highest trim line of the Chrysler brand.  Packard discontinued independent production 
in 1956, becoming a rebadged Studebaker for the 1957 and 1958 model years and the 





Appendix E – Style Change Index 
 
Source: Frederic Stuart, ed. Factors Affecting Determination of Market Shares in the 
American Automobile Industry (Hempstead, N.Y.: Hofstra University) 1965, pages 
87-94. 
 
In an attempt to determine the extent to which the annual model change helped to sell 
cars, a group of students in Hofstra University’s School of Business devised a scale
by which the extent to which a particular model year’s car could by quantitatively 
compared with the same make of car for the previous year.  They called this figure 
the “Style Change Index”.  A car in which all componants – body, frame, and 
mechanical – were significantly changed would receive a score of 4.0. 
 
  Cadillac Lincoln Imperial* Packard 
 
1950  0.9  1.0  0.4  0.5    
 
1951  0.4  0.6  1.0  1.2 
 
1952  0.4  1.1  0.3  0.7   
 
1953  0.4  0.4  1.1  0.6 
 
1954  2.0  0.2  0.7  0.5 
 
1955  0.6  0.8  0.5  0.4 
 
1956  1.9  1.8  1.3  1.1 
 
1957  1.2  1.5  2.2  ----- 
 
1958  0.4  1.6  1.2  ----- 
 
1959  0.9  0.5  1.4  ----- 
 
1960   0.6  0.8  1.1  ----- 
 
* Since the study did not specifically break out Imperial, the style change index for 





Appendix F.  Comparative Price Charts 
 
Source: Auto Editors of Consumer Guide, Encyclopedia of American Cars 























Appendix G.  General Economic Information 
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